CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-EXCLUSION OF CONTRABAND EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY AN ILLEGAL SEARCH ON PREMISES NOT OWNED BY DEFENDANT

The defendant was in the unlawful possession of narcotics. Having been given a key by his two aunts to their hotel room with authority to use the room at will, defendant stored the narcotics there without the knowledge of the occupants. A federal officer entered the hotel room, searched the room, and seized the narcotics during the absence of the occupants, without a search warrant. The defendant was arrested the following day and claimed ownership of the seized narcotics. He was convicted in the District Court of the District of Columbia for violation of federal law, the court refusing to suppress the seized narcotics as evidence at the trial despite timely motion by the defendant to exclude. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, the Chief Justice and Justice Reed dissenting. Although the defendant had no interest in the place searched, he had a sufficient interest in the contraband narcotics seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be entitled to their exclusion as evidence on his trial. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.·48, 72 S.Ct. 93 (1951)

CRIMINAL LAW-APPLICATION OF MURDER-FELONY DOCTRINE WHERE HOMICIDE WAS THE ACT OF A NON-PARTICIPANT IN THE FELONY

The appellant and another entered a filling station for the purpose of committing an armed robbery, held up those present, and then separated in search of money after the owner had refused to disclose its location. The unarmed deceased, a friend of the owner, attacked the appellant in an effort to frustrate the robbery. A brief struggle followed during which the deceased obtained possession of the appellant\u27s pistol and struck appellant on the head with it, thereby causing the accidental discharge of the bullet which killed him. The appellant was convicted of murder. On appeal, held, affirmed. The alleged fact that the deceased shot himself during a scuffle after wresting the gun from the appellant was no defense. The appellant\u27s act set in motion the cause which occasioned the death of the deceased; therefore his felonious act was the proximate cause of the homicide. Miers v. State, (Tex. Crim. App. 1952) 251 S.W. (2d) 404

NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-LIABILITY OF STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL FOR ACTS OF A DANGEROUS PATIENT AFTER IMPROPER DISCHARGE

One Jones, a mental incompetent, was erroneously released as recovered from a state hospital for the criminal insane, after having been transferred there because of his dangerous behavior at a state penal institution. Jones\u27 frequent assaultive behavior at the hospital was not reported in his case history upon which the determination of his recovery was partially based, nor was any inquiry made into the motivation for such conduct. Crowded conditions and an inadequate psychiatric staff were responsible for the improper diagnosis of the patient\u27s condition and his ultimate discharge. Four days after his release he killed four persons. The administratrix of the estate of one of the decedents sued for wrongful death, asserting negligence in the release of Jones. Held, judgment for the plaintiff. Having knowledge of the incompetent\u27s dangerous tendencies, the state had the duty to follow ordinary psychiatric procedure in determining the propriety of the patient\u27s release. By reason of its failure in this respect the state was negligent and thus liable for the death caused by the released inmate. St. George v. State, 118 N. Y. S. (2d) 596 (1953)

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPRESSIONS OF PAIN AND SUFFERING

Notwithstanding medical achievements, the human being has not yet been immunized from physical injury and the pain customarily attending such injury. This fact coupled with the ill-controlled fury of modem life has led to an enormous amount of personal injury litigation. Such litigation, with rare exceptions, presents an evidentiary feature of pain and suffering of the victim. Most often the problem arises where pain and suffering are an element of the damages, although it may likewise be involved in showing the nature or the extent of the physical injury

Liability for Product Design in Ohio - A First Step Toward Solution

This article concerns an area of the law of strict liability in tort which is now emerging from an embryonic stage in Ohio - namely, a manufacturer\u27s liability for conscious design choices in developing its product. It is the thesis of this article that in the recent case of Temple v. Wean United, Inc., the Ohio Supreme Court has taken a major step toward a solution to the inherent difficulties in passing judgment upon the reasonableness of a manufacturer\u27s conscious design choices. In doing so, the court has simultaneously lessened the otherwise open-ended exposure of manufacturers to liability concerning claims of defective product design