Turkish Voter Response to Government Incompetence and Corruption Related to the 1999 Earthquakes

The two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999, caused enormous amounts of death and destruction, and exposed rampant government corruption involving construction and zoning code violations, as a factor magnifying the disaster. The opposition parties and one of the incumbent parties which participated in previous national governments and held power in current and past municipal administrations were responsible for that. The other two incumbent parties came to power only a short time before the earthquakes and controlled almost none of the local administrations in the disaster zone. They on the other hand, were responsible for the incompetence shown in providing relief, for involvement in corruption related to those efforts, and for failing to prosecute the businessmen who constructed the shoddy buildings and the corrupt officials who permitted them. How voters responded to these in the 2002 parliamentary elections is investigated, using cross-provincial data, controlling for other social, political and economic factors. The fact that different groups of parties were responsible for different types of corruption and mismanagement provided us with a unique data to differentiate between voter responses to corruption and incompetence, and to corruption which has occurred before and after the earthquakes. Our results show that voters punished all of the political parties which participated in governments during the previous decade. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for disaster relief, and parties that controlled more of the city administrations in the quake zone were blamed more. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the main beneficiary of the votes lost by these parties. Our results corroborate the view in the corruption literature that voters react drastically only when the corruption is massive, the information on it highly-credible and well-publicized, involves large number of political parties, not accompanied by competent governance, and a non-corrupt alternative is available.Turkey; Natural disaster; Earthquake; Corruption; Government performance; Elections; Voter behavior; Party preference

Impact of the 1999 Earthquakes on the Outcome of the 2002 Parliamentary Election in Turkey

The two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999, not only caused enormous amounts of death, destruction and suffering, but also exposed rampant government corruption involving construction and zoning code violations. The incompetence shown by the government in providing relief, the corruption allegations in regards to those efforts, and government’s failure to prosecute corrupt officials and businessmen, further angered the public. How voters responded to these in the 2002 parliamentary election is investigated, using cross-provincial data, and controlling for other social, political and economic factors. Our results show that voters held accountable all of the political parties which participated in governments during the last decade or so, and not just the incumbents in 2002. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for earthquake relief, and parties that served longest and controlled more of the city administrations in the quake zone were blamed more. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the beneficiary of the votes lost by these parties. The sensitivity shown by the electorate to real and perceived corruption implies that corruption problem will be tractable in Turkey, and can be reduced through increased transparency and democratization.Turkey, earthquake, corruption, election, party preference

Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the 1995 Turkish Parliamentary Election Results

1995 Turkish parliamentary election was held almost under the conditions of a controlled experiment. The unique cross-section data pertaining to this election and the economic and political conditions surrounding it were utilized to study the relationship between the government’s economic performance and the vote shares of political parties. Turkish voters are found to be myopic, not looking back beyond the election year in assessing the government’s economic performance. A good performance is found to benefit the primary incumbent party at the expense of extremist opposition parties and a bad performance is found to benefit extremist opposition parties at the expense of the primary party in power. The junior party in a coalition government and the centrist opposition parties appear to be unaffected by the economic conditions. Evidence found is consistent with a strategic voting by the electorate, to diffuse power and/or to try parties and leaders that were not tried before or last tried a long time ago. These conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries.Turkey, election

Turkish voter response to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes

The two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999, caused enormous amounts of death and destruction, and exposed rampant government corruption involving construction and zoning code violations, as a factor magnifying the disaster. The opposition parties and one of the incumbent parties which participated in previous national governments and held power in current and past municipal administrations were responsible for that. The other two incumbent parties came to power only a short time before the earthquakes and controlled almost none of the local administrations in the disaster zone. They on the other hand, were responsible for the incompetence shown in providing relief, for involvement in corruption related to those efforts, and for failing to prosecute the businessmen who constructed the shoddy buildings and the corrupt officials who permitted them. How voters responded to these in the 2002 parliamentary elections is investigated, using cross-provincial data, controlling for other social, political and economic factors. The fact that different groups of parties were responsible for different types of corruption and mismanagement provided us with a unique data to differentiate between voter responses to corruption and incompetence, and to corruption which has occurred before and after the earthquakes. Our results show that voters punished all of the political parties which participated in governments during the previous decade. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for disaster relief, and parties that controlled more of the city administrations in the quake zone were blamed more. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the main beneficiary of the votes lost by these parties. Our results corroborate the view in the corruption literature that voters react drastically only when the corruption is massive, the information on it highly-credible and well-publicized, involves large number of political parties, not accompanied by competent governance, and a non-corrupt alternative is available.

Turkish voter response to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes

The two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999, caused enormous amounts of death and destruction, and exposed rampant government corruption involving construction and zoning code violations, as a factor magnifying the disaster. The opposition parties and one of the incumbent parties which participated in previous national governments and held power in current and past municipal administrations were responsible for that. The other two incumbent parties came to power only a short time before the earthquakes and controlled almost none of the local administrations in the disaster zone. They on the other hand, were responsible for the incompetence shown in providing relief, for involvement in corruption related to those efforts, and for failing to prosecute the businessmen who constructed the shoddy buildings and the corrupt officials who permitted them. How voters responded to these in the 2002 parliamentary elections is investigated, using cross-provincial data, controlling for other social, political and economic factors. The fact that different groups of parties were responsible for different types of corruption and mismanagement provided us with a unique data to differentiate between voter responses to corruption and incompetence, and to corruption which has occurred before and after the earthquakes. Our results show that voters punished all of the political parties which participated in governments during the previous decade. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for disaster relief, and parties that controlled more of the city administrations in the quake zone were blamed more. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the main beneficiary of the votes lost by these parties. Our results corroborate the view in the corruption literature that voters react drastically only when the corruption is massive, the information on it highly-credible and well-publicized, involves large number of political parties, not accompanied by competent governance, and a non-corrupt alternative is available.Turkey; Natural disaster; Earthquake; Corruption; Government performance; Elections; Voter behavior; Party preference

Convergence of Sectoral Productivity in Turkish Provinces: A Markov Chains Model

this study examines the role that sectors play in aggregate convergence of provincial labor productivity across the 67 provinces of turkey during the 1975-1990 period. a markov chain model is applied to characterize the long-run tendencies of productivity both at the aggregate and sectoral levels. in order to determine the likely sources of aggregate fluctuations, sectoral time-invariant distributions are compared with the aggregate distribution, and those sectors that exhibit similar distribution patterns as that of the aggregate distribution are characterized as dominant sectors. evidence strongly suggests that the aggregate time-invariant distribution is determined mainly by the agricultural, industrial and transportation sectors. specifically, the pattern of polarization of productivity levels in these three sectors is very similar to the pattern prevailing at the aggregate level. the results suggest that, in the long run, two convergence clubs are likely to emerge - one for the agricultural and another for the highly industrialized provinces. an exception is the service sector, which exhibits global convergence.convergence; aggregate and sectoral labor productivity; markov chains

Model-Reference Adaptive Control of Distributed Lagrangian Infinite-Dimensional Systems Using Hamiltons Principle

This paper presents a Hamilton's principle for distributed control of infinite-dimensional systems modeled by a distributed form of the Euler-Lagrange method. The distributed systems are governed by a system of linear partial differential equations in space and time. A generalized potential energy expression is developed that can capture most physical systems including those systems that have no spatial distribution. The Hamilton's principle is applied to derive distributed feedback control methods without resorting to the standard weak-form discretization approach to convert an infinite-dimensional systems to a finite-dimensional systems. It can be shown by the principle of least action that the distributed control synthesized by the Hamilton's principle is a minimum-norm control. A model-reference adaptive control framework is developed for distributed Lagrangian systems in the presence of uncertainty. The theory is demonstrated by an application of adaptive flutter suppression control of a flexible aircraft wing

The FastMap Algorithm for Shortest Path Computations

We present a new preprocessing algorithm for embedding the nodes of a given edge-weighted undirected graph into a Euclidean space. The Euclidean distance between any two nodes in this space approximates the length of the shortest path between them in the given graph. Later, at runtime, a shortest path between any two nodes can be computed with A* search using the Euclidean distances as heuristic. Our preprocessing algorithm, called FastMap, is inspired by the data mining algorithm of the same name and runs in near-linear time. Hence, FastMap is orders of magnitude faster than competing approaches that produce a Euclidean embedding using Semidefinite Programming. FastMap also produces admissible and consistent heuristics and therefore guarantees the generation of shortest paths. Moreover, FastMap applies to general undirected graphs for which many traditional heuristics, such as the Manhattan Distance heuristic, are not well defined. Empirically, we demonstrate that A* search using the FastMap heuristic is competitive with A* search using other state-of-the-art heuristics, such as the Differential heuristic

Discrete Convex Functions on Graphs and Their Algorithmic Applications

The present article is an exposition of a theory of discrete convex functions on certain graph structures, developed by the author in recent years. This theory is a spin-off of discrete convex analysis by Murota, and is motivated by combinatorial dualities in multiflow problems and the complexity classification of facility location problems on graphs. We outline the theory and algorithmic applications in combinatorial optimization problems