Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges

Has classical gene position been practically reduced?

One of the defining features of the classical gene was its position (a band in the chromosome). In molecular genetics, positions are defined instead as nucleotide numbers and there is no clear correspondence with its classical counterpart. However, the classical gene position did not simply disappear with the development of the molecular approach, but survived in the lab associated to different genetic practices. The survival of classical gene position would illustrate Waters’ view about the practical persistence of the genetic approach beyond reductionism and anti-reductionist claims. We show instead that at the level of laboratory practices there are also reductive processes, operating through the rise and fall of different techniques. Molecular markers made the concept of classical gene position practically dispensable, leading us to rethink whether it had any causal role or was just a mere heuristi

Marine Biodiversity Databanks

International audienceThis chapter presents the contribution of databanks to the developmentof biodiversity knowledge through the example of marine biodiversity databanks.Focusing on the marine field allows us to insist on the imbalance of the unknown vs.the better known part. The chapter emphasizes the role of taxonomic and geneticdatabanks as well as the ongoing transformations that databanks are submitted to inorder to answer pressing demands due to the biodiversity crisis. It aims to analysethe requirements biodiversity databanks have to satisfy in order to help bothresearchers and conservationists in their respective endeavors. It begins by pointingout the main characteristics and limits of biodiversity knowledge and defend theview that databanks are well-suited to overcome these limits as soon as they arewidely accessible and interoperable. These constraints are analysed as both technicaland scientific. Their dynamic dimension is emphasized as databanks must complywith the rapid evolution of scientific knowledge. We also propose a view on therelationships between biodiversity knowledge, assessment, and conservation