Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Implementation in South Korea: Lessons from American and British CSR Policies

The primary purpose of this research is to distinguish between government-led and society-led implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The first part of this paper works to answer the question of why CSR has remained largely a Western phenomenon. Then, through a comparison between the United Kingdom and the United States, research for this study suggests that the U.K. tends to adopt the top-down approach whereas the U.S. adopts a bottom-up approach towards CSR. The second part of this research revolves around what these findings suggest in order to advance the overall CSR program within South Korea. It argues that South Korea needs to adopt more of the top-down approach for the better enactment and implementation of CSR

In Shame I Will Find Paradise

As a Korean American non-binary digital artist and designer, my recent explorations have focused on using voice as a medium to articulate nuanced feelings of displacement and the intricate relationships between language, identity, and expression. This journey expands beyond my personal experiences with gender dysphoria, delving into the lives of non-binary and transgender individuals undergoing gender-affirming voice therapy. Through my thesis research, I have developed interactive multimedia installations inspired by dialogues with individuals such as Umico Niwa, who traveled to Korea for voice feminization surgery, and Jeong Yoon Lee from Hyperlink Press, a four-year participant in Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT). During our conversations, Jeong revealed how a 2000s-era karaoke machine provided him with control over his body and time, enabling him to monitor his voice as it navigated through text prior to his transition. This experience inspired me to create an absurdist visual poetry piece utilizing the broken karaoke machine as a portal to manipulate time and voice, culminating in a multimedia portrait of Jeong. The discourse surrounding gender-affirming surgery often showcases a limited binary perspective, shaped by a cisgender, heteronormative medical viewpoint. These discussions resonate with my own experiences related to the Korean diaspora, which involve complex issues of language, gender, and nationality. I draw inspiration from avant-garde Korean writers and poets such as Yi Sang and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, who explored the themes of displacement and erasure experienced by once-colonized cultures through their innovative use of language. Similarly, the transgender community has a vibrant history of playfully exploring and redefining their identities

Structural estimation of economic sanctions

When are economic sanctions expected to succeed? Previous studies predict that sanctions will be more effective when the issue at stake is important, when the sender and target are allied, when the target’s domestic institutions are more democratic, and when the target’s economy is dependent on the sender’s. This article subjects these explanations to an empirical test using a new fully structural estimation that employs a game theoretic model as a statistical model. The initiation and outcomes of sanctions are incorporated with the strategic behaviors of sender and target states into a unified model. The model improves upon extant models by allowing the initial choice of the sender states to be multiple, not binary. This non-binary option enables the sender states to opt for the optimal intensity level of sanctions. Findings suggest that issue salience is positively associated with the decision to impose sanctions, but not necessarily with their effectiveness. Further, allied targets tend to comply even when they can win a sanctions contest, while non-allied targets tend to resist even when they know that on average the sender is likely to continue sanctioning in the face of resistance. Since sanctions imposed from 1903 to 2002 take place disproportionately between non-allied dyads, and thus belong to the category of sanctions most likely to fail, we can begin to understand why sanctions have such a low success rate. </jats:p

Structural estimation of economic sanctions: From initiation to outcomes

When are economic sanctions expected to succeed? Previous studies predict that sanctions will be more effective when the issue at stake is important, when the sender and target are allied, when the target’s domestic institutions are more democratic, and when the target’s economy is dependent on the sender’s. This article subjects these explanations to an empirical test using a new fully structural estimation that employs a game theoretic model as a statistical model. The initiation and outcomes of sanctions are incorporated with the strategic behaviors of sender and target states into a unified model. The model improves upon extant models by allowing the initial choice of the sender states to be multiple, not binary. This non-binary option enables the sender states to opt for the optimal intensity level of sanctions. Findings suggest that issue salience is positively associated with the decision to impose sanctions, but not necessarily with their effectiveness. Further, allied targets tend to comply even when they can win a sanctions contest, while non-allied targets tend to resist even when they know that on average the sender is likely to continue sanctioning in the face of resistance. Since sanctions imposed from 1903 to 2002 take place disproportionately between non-allied dyads, and thus belong to the category of sanctions most likely to fail, we can begin to understand why sanctions have such a low success rate.democracy; economic sanctions; EITM (Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models); issue salience; military alliance; structural estimation

International Signaling and Economic Sanctions

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Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States

Why do we observe economic sanctions despite strong doubts regarding their effectiveness? While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, no one has assessed this alternative explanation empirically. I investigate the symbolic use of sanctions for domestic political gain in the United States, assessing in particular the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings. Findings suggest that policymakers benefit from imposing sanctions through increased domestic support. This domestic political gain can present policymakers with an incentive to use sanctions as a low-cost way of displaying strong leadership during international conflicts

International Signaling and Economic Sanctions

N/

Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States

Why do we observe economic sanctions despite strong doubts regarding their effectiveness? While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, no one has assessed this alternative explanation empirically. I investigate the symbolic use of sanctions for domestic political gain in the United States, assessing in particular the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings. Findings suggest that policymakers benefit from imposing sanctions through increased domestic support. This domestic political gain can present policymakers with an incentive to use sanctions as a low-cost way of displaying strong leadership during international conflicts