War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.human capital investment

Welfare and Trade without Pareto

Head, Keith Mayer, Thierry Thoenig, Mathias Welfare and Trade without Pareto American Economic Review 104 5 310-16 2014 10.1257/aer.104.5.310 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.5.31

A macroeconomic perspective on knowledge management

This paper provides a theory of the interactions between knowledge codification, firm-level organization structures, information diffusion and the dynamics of technological competition. At the firm level, we focus on incentives to design Knowledge Management policies based on the codification of soft into hard information. At the aggregate level, we discuss the endogenous nature of knowledge spillover and the implications for macroeconomic growth. The model predicts the existence of a bell shaped relationship between knowledge codification and technological competition

Civil Wars and International Trade

This article analyzes empirically the relationship between civil wars and international trade. We first show that trade destruction due to civil wars is very large and persistent and increases with the severity of the conflict. We then identify two effects that trade can have on the risk of civil conflicts: It may act as a deterrent if trade gain's are put at risk during civil wars, but it may also act as an insurance if international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during civil wars. We find Support for the presence of these two mechanisms and conclude that trade openness may deter the most severe civil wars (those that destroy the largest amount of trade) but may increase the risk of lower-scale conflicts

Growth and Risk at the Industry-level: The Real Effects of Financial Liberalization

This paper analyzes the effects of financial liberalization on growth and volatility at the industry level in a large sample of countries. We estimate the impact of liberalization on production, employment, firm entry, capital accumulation, and productivity. In order to overcome omitted variables concerns, we employ a number of alternative difference-in-differences estimation strategies. We implement a propensity score matching algorithm to find a control group for each liberalizing country. In addition, we exploit variation in industry characteristics to obtain an alternative set of difference-in-differences estimates. Financial liberalization is found to have a positive effect on both growth and volatility of production across industries. The positive growth effect comes from increased entry of firms, higher capital accumulation, and an expansion in total employment. By contrast, we do not detect any effect of financial liberalization on measured productivity. Finally, the growth effects of liberalization appear temporary rather than permanent

Investigating the Origins of Capitalism-Aversion

There are two non-mutually exclusive theories of individual variations in pro-capitalism opinions. The first theory views pro-capitalism opinions as self-serving: Individuals are opposed to market forces when they threaten their economic rents. The second theory views differences in such opinions as reflecting genuine disagreement on the efficiency of various economic systems. Using individual data, we investigate the validity of both theories, focusing on attitudes toward private ownership, private profit and competition. We find evidence that the first theory explains some of the variations in attitudes. However, consistent with the second theory, we also find evidence of individual learning about the comparative virtues of economic systems. The learning is slow, home-biased and path-dependent. Long-run cultural and historical determinants of pro-market attitudes, such as religion and legal origins, explain more than 40% of the cross-country variations in capitalism aversion. Last, we provide tentative evidence that at the country level, pro-market opinions affect the nature of economic institutions. Our results suggest that the feasibility of economic reform does not depend solely on its impact on the distribution of rents; ideological a-prioris are likely to be important as well