Cradled in the Declaration of Independence

This book review engages recent scholarship on the nature of civil-rights lawyering in the African-American bar in the generation before Brown v. Board of Education. Using the recent biography of Earl Burrus Dickerson, one of the leaders of the African-American bar before World War II, the book review finds support for the emerging view that, in the years before Brown, the African-American civil-rights bar was not focused on ending de jure segregation in public institutions, but rather in building up African-American institutions. Contrary to recent scholarship, however, the review suggests that Dickerson personally preferred a more integrationist strategy, and his efforts to build up African-American institutions was less a conscious strategy than a realization of the limitations on his ability to practice law as he wished. Freedom of action, rather than racial equality, was Dickerson\u27s great motivator

Auctioning Class Settlements

Although class actions promise better deterrence at a lower cost, they are infected with problems that can keep them from delivering on this promise. One of these problems occurs when the agents for the class—the class representative and class counsel—advance their own interests at the expense of the class. Controlling agency cost, which often manifests itself at the time of settlement, has been the impetus behind a number of class action reform proposals. This Article develops a proposal that, in conjunction with reforms in fee structure and opt-out rights, controls agency costs at the time of settlement. The idea is to allow the court, once a settlement has been achieved, to put the class’s claims up for auction, with the settlement acting as a reserve price. An entity that outbids the settlement becomes owner of the class’s claims and may continue to pursue the case against the defendant. A successful auction results in more compensation for the class. On the other hand, if no bids are received, the court has evidence that the settlement was fair. The prospect of a settlement auction also deters class counsel and the defendant from negotiating a sweetheart deal that sells out the class. The Article works through a series of theoretical and practical issues in settlement auctions, including the standards that a court should use to evaluate bids, the limitations on who may bid, and ways to encourage the emergence of an auction market

Designing the Host-Guest Properties of Tetranuclear Arene Ruthenium Metalla-Rectangles to Accommodate a Pyrene Molecule

Cationic tetranuclear arene ruthenium complexes of the general formula [Ru4(p-cymene)4(N∩N)2(dhnq)2]4+ comprising rectangular structures are obtained in methanol from the reaction of the dinuclear arene ruthenium precursor [Ru2(p-cymene)2(dhnq)2Cl2] (dhnq = 5,8-dihydroxy-1,4-naphthoquinonato) with pyrazine or bipyridine linkers [N∩N = pyrazine, 1; 4,4-bipyridine, 2; 1,2-bis(4-pyridyl)ethylene, 3] in the presence of AgCF3SO3. All complexes 1-3, isolated in good yield as triflate salts, have been characterised by NMR and IR spectroscopy. The interaction of these rectangular complexes with pyrene as a guest molecule has been studied in solution by various NMR techniques (1D, DOSY, ROESY). In [D3]acetonitrile, the pyrazine-containing metalla-rectangle 1 shows no meaningful interactions with pyrene. On the other hand, the 4,4-bipyridine- and 1,2-bis(4-pyridyl)ethylene-containing metalla-rectangles 2 and 3 clearly interact with pyrene in [D3]acetonitrile. DOSY measurements suggest that, in the case of [Ru4p-cymene)4(4,4-bipyridine)2(dhnq)2]4+ (2), the interactions occur on the outside of the rectangular assembly, while in the case of [Ru4(p-cymene)4{1,2-bis(4-pyridyl)ethylene}2 (dhnq)2]4+ (3), the pyrene molecule is found inside the hydrophobic cavity of the metalla-rectangle, thus giving rise to a host-guest system

A Process Theory of Torts

This article is meant to reconcile two schools of intellectual thought regarding tort law, the conceptualist and the anti-conceptualist. It argues that torts must be understood as a system in perpetual process--forever indefinite and infinitely malleable in its precise theoretical, doctrinal and practical manifestations--yet ultimately bounded in its possibilities. It then defines the limits of torts law as a process that constantly regenerates the old face of tort theory, doctrine and practice into the new

The Litigation Budget

Because of fears that litigation is too costly, reduction of litigation expenses has been the touchstone of procedural reform for the past thirty years. In certain circumstances, however, the parties have incentives—both rational and irrational—to spend more on a lawsuit than the social benefits that the case provides. Present and proposed reform efforts do not adequately address these incentives, and, in some instances, exacerbate the parties’ incentives to overspend. The best way to ensure that the cost of a lawsuit does not exceed the benefits that it provides to the parties and society is to control spending directly: to require the parties to file and live within litigation budgets. These “costs budgets,” which are already in use in the United Kingdom, help to ensure that the costs of litigation remain less than the benefits. After describing the workings of a costs-budget system, the Article considers practical, political, and constitutional critiques. None of these concerns is disabling. American rulemakers who are serious about containing the litigation costs should grant courts the power to use costs budgets