Different investment treaties, different effects

Until recently, quantitative assessments of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) have tended to treat them as interchangeable. Such assessments assume that the only measure of investor protections encoded in IIAs is whether a treaty had been signed and/or entered into force. However, the actual investment effects of investment treaties depend greatly on context

不同的投资协定具有不同的效应

直到最近，国际投资协定的定量评估（IIAS）都倾向于将它们视为可互换的。这样的评估假设，国际投资协议中编码的唯一的投资者保护措施是，一项条约是否已签署和/或生效。然而，投资条约的实际投资效果很大程度上取决于具体情况

Replication Data for: Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

Includes an explanatory document, data, and R files

Replication Data for: Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

Includes an explanatory document, data, and R files

Going to Geneva? Trade protection and dispute resolution under the GATT and WTO.

This dissertation examines government decisions to initiate and resolve trade disputes under the dispute settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This study is motivated by the fact that few disputes are taken before the GATT or WTO for formal legal adjudication, and that trade disputes emerge, evolve, and end in a predictable manner. The trade dispute process entails a series of three sequential decisions: to impose a potentially objectionable trade barrier, to challenge such a barrier before the GATT/WTO, and to resolve a GATT/WTO dispute through a panel ruling as opposed to an out of court settlement. The first overarching finding is that international law exerts a significant impact on government behavior at all three stages of a trade dispute. For one, governments typically follow international legal rules for imposing trade protection, even when there are political incentives to behave otherwise. They are deterred further from imposing illegal trade protection when they fear being challenged before the new, stronger WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In addition, governments are more likely to take before the GATT or WTO those cases that have the strongest legal merit, as well as to seek legal panel rulings to resolve those disputes that are the most uncertain and intractable. A second overall finding is that domestic political considerations motivate many trade dispute choices. Most notably, government leaders take before the GATT and WTO those disputes that promise the greatest potential domestic political and economic rewards. Furthermore, leaders tend to seek the political cover of GATT/WTO panel rulings when they face sizeable domestic constraints. These findings emerge from the estimation of multivariate statistical models that account for the selection dynamics inherent to the trade dispute process. The statistical tests are performed using an original data set that contains information on more than 4,600 possible and actual GATT and WTO trade disputes among 95 countries over the past four decades.Ph.D.International lawPolitical scienceSocial SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/123776/2/3106004.pd