Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strenght. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prives when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admin closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form

Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strenght. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prives when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admin closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form.Two-Sided Market; Network Effects; Monopoly Experimentation; Bayesian Learning; Optimal Control

An integrated approach to model redispatch and to assess potential benefits from market splitting in Germany

Future congestion management is one of the major market design issues in the European electricity market. In the light of the sharp increase in redispatch measures seen within the last years, the importance of an efficient management of network congestion increases particularly in Germany. Against this background, we develop an integrated approach to model (re)dispatch for Germany in detail while considering interactions with neighbouring countries. Compared to 2011, our findings indicate a much more critical network situation in Germany for 2015. We identify increased RES production, resulting imports and exports, delays in grid extension and the impacts of the nuclear phase-out (leading to an amplified north-south congestion problem) as main drivers for the nearly doubling of redispatch volumes in 2015. We show that market splitting can potentially contribute to a secure grid operation and leads to a significant reduction of redispatch volumes (59%) according our model calculations. We state that market splitting can of course not be the ‘one and only solution’ but an interim approach to manage upcoming congestion in Germany in times when grid expansion has not yet been completed and that the implementation of market splitting can also serve as an alternative to grid extension within less congested areas

Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided mar- ket. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two sides are approximately symmetric. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently well known and weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prices when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal pol- icy does not admit closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form

Impacts of Res-Generation and Demand Pattern on Net Transfer Capatity: Implications for Effectiveness of Market Splitting in Germany

For the further development of an integrated European electricity market, congestion management mechanisms are one of the major market design issues. Against the background of increasing generation from RES and resulting congestions, an efficient management of network congestions is gaining importance especially in Germany. Introducing nodal pricing as the first best mechanism is not considered to be realistic for Germany in the nearer future. Yet the splitting of the German electricity market into several market zones will also improve congestion management. A key issue in the so-called market splitting is the determination of the net transfer capacity (NTC) between the market zones as it determines the effectiveness of market splitting as congestion management mechanism. We therefore develop an integrated approach to incorporate the effects of renewables feed-in, load pattern and cross border flows on NTCs. We conclude that the NTCs strongly depend on RES infeed and that this effect has to be considered when modelling alternative congestion management mechanisms like market splitting

Einsatz von Social Software in Unternehmen: Studie über Umfang und Zweck der Nutzung

Wikipedia, Facebook und Flickr sind nur einige Beispiele erfolgreicher öffentlicher Social Software-Anwendungen. Es stellt sich zunehmend die Frage, welchen Stellenwert die Nutzung von Social Software für Unternehmen hat. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht stellt die Ergebnisse einer Studie zum Umfang und Zweck der Nutzung von Social Software innerhalb von Unternehmen dar. Es werden unter anderem die Fragen beantwortet, welche Anwendungen am häufigsten Verwendung finden und welche Vor- und Nachteile mit dem Einsatz verbunden sind. Die Resultate basieren auf fünf qualitativen Einzelfallstudien, sowie einer quantitativen Online-Umfrage, welche im deutschsprachigen Raum durchgeführt wurden. Abschließend werden die Resultate mit denen anderer Studien zum gleichen Themengebiet verglichen

Die Organisation der künstlerischen Intelligenz in Rußland in den Jahren 1992/93

Das Ende der Sowjetunion und die Neukonstituierung der Russischen Föderation beschleunigten auch in den Organisationen der künstlerischen Intelligenz die während der Perestroika eingeleitete Umstrukturierung und die Neubestimmung von Aufgaben. Durch das Erstarken der Marktkräfte wurde der Zugang zu den materiellen Ressourcen der Kultursphäre zunehmend an den Verbänden vorbei geregelt. Der Besitz der Verbände dezimierte sich in den Wirren der Jahre 1991 und 1992 durch Inflation, Privatisierung und individuelle Bereicherung einiger führender Vertreter. Die weiter zunehmende soziale Unsicherheit der einzelnen Kulturschaffenden provozierte die Gründung von Parallelorganisationen, die sich bewußt als Gewerkschaften verstehen. (ICE

Die "Freiheit des Wortes": nach dem Pressegesetz

Die beiden Beiträge des Heftes setzen sich mit der Situation der Presse in der Sowjetunion auseinander. Im ersten Beitrag wird das Gesetz "Über die Presse und andere Masseninformationsmedien" vom 12. Juni 1990 analysiert. An zwei Beispielen, an den Konflikten um "Ogonek" und um "Literaturnaja Gazeta", werden Aspekte und Austragungsformen der in dem Kontext dieses Gesetzes auftretenden Konflikte untersucht. Im zweiten Beitrag wird in einem Rückblick die Auseinandersetzung um die Zeitschrift "Novyj mir" und ihren Chefredakteur A. Tvardovskij analysiert. Zum einen wird die Polemik der Jahre 1988/89 interpretiert. Zum anderen wird der politische Charakter der angeblichen Literaturauseinandersetzung offengelegt, um auf diese Weise zur Diskussion um die Reformierbarkeit der Kulturinstitutionen beizutragen. (ICA