Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure

The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

Anarchy in the UK: Detailed genetic analysis of worker reproduction in a naturally occurring British anarchistic honeybee, Apis mellifera, colony using DNA microsatellites

Anarchistic behaviour is a very rare phenotype of honeybee colonies. In an anarchistic colony, many workers’ sons are reared in the presence of the queen. Anarchy has previously been described in only two Australian colonies. Here we report on a first detailed genetic analysis of a British anarchistic colony. Male pupae were present in great abundance above the queen excluder, which was clearly indicative of extensive worker reproduction and is the hallmark of anarchy. Seventeen microsatellite loci were used to analyse these male pupae, allowing us to address whether all the males were indeed workers’ sons, and how many worker patrilines and individual workers produced them. In the sample, 95 of 96 of the males were definitely workers’ sons. Given that ≈ 1% of workers’ sons were genetically indistinguishable from queen’s sons, this suggests that workers do not move any queen-laid eggs between the part of the colony where the queen is present to the area above the queen excluder which the queen cannot enter. The colony had 16 patrilines, with an effective number of patrilines of 9.85. The 75 males that could be assigned with certainty to a patriline came from 7 patrilines, with an effective number of 4.21. They were the offspring of at least 19 workers. This is in contrast to the two previously studied Australian naturally occurring anarchist colonies, in which most of the workers’ sons were offspring of one patriline. The high number of patrilines producing males leads to a low mean relatedness between laying workers and males of the colony. We discuss the importance of studying such colonies in the understanding of worker policing and its evolution

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.Comment: 7 pages, 7 figure

Female economic dependence and the morality of promiscuity

This article is made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund. Copyright @ The Author(s) 2014.In environments in which female economic dependence on a male mate is higher, male parental investment is more essential. In such environments, therefore, both sexes should value paternity certainty more and thus object more to promiscuity (because promiscuity undermines paternity certainty). We tested this theory of anti-promiscuity morality in two studies (N = 656 and N = 4,626) using U.S. samples. In both, we examined whether opposition to promiscuity was higher among people who perceived greater female economic dependence in their social network. In Study 2, we also tested whether economic indicators of female economic dependence (e.g., female income, welfare availability) predicted anti-promiscuity morality at the state level. Results from both studies supported the proposed theory. At the individual level, perceived female economic dependence explained significant variance in anti-promiscuity morality, even after controlling for variance explained by age, sex, religiosity, political conservatism, and the anti-promiscuity views of geographical neighbors. At the state level, median female income was strongly negatively related to anti-promiscuity morality and this relationship was fully mediated by perceived female economic dependence. These results were consistent with the view that anti-promiscuity beliefs may function to promote paternity certainty in circumstances where male parental investment is particularly important

Disordered Environments in Spatial Games

The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site diluted lattices. The main result is that due to disorder, the fraction of cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a dynamical transition at $\rho^*$, separating a region with spatial chaos from one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Growth dynamics and the evolution of cooperation in microbial populations

Microbes providing public goods are widespread in nature despite running the risk of being exploited by free-riders. However, the precise ecological factors supporting cooperation are still puzzling. Following recent experiments, we consider the role of population growth and the repetitive fragmentation of populations into new colonies mimicking simple microbial life-cycles. Individual-based modeling reveals that demographic fluctuations, which lead to a large variance in the composition of colonies, promote cooperation. Biased by population dynamics these fluctuations result in two qualitatively distinct regimes of robust cooperation under repetitive fragmentation into groups. First, if the level of cooperation exceeds a threshold, cooperators will take over the whole population. Second, cooperators can also emerge from a single mutant leading to a robust coexistence between cooperators and free-riders. We find frequency and size of population bottlenecks, and growth dynamics to be the major ecological factors determining the regimes and thereby the evolutionary pathway towards cooperation.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figure

Lightweight Interactions for Reciprocal Cooperation in a Social Network Game

The construction of reciprocal relationships requires cooperative interactions during the initial meetings. However, cooperative behavior with strangers is risky because the strangers may be exploiters. In this study, we show that people increase the likelihood of cooperativeness of strangers by using lightweight non-risky interactions in risky situations based on the analysis of a social network game (SNG). They can construct reciprocal relationships in this manner. The interactions involve low-cost signaling because they are not generated at any cost to the senders and recipients. Theoretical studies show that low-cost signals are not guaranteed to be reliable because the low-cost signals from senders can lie at any time. However, people used low-cost signals to construct reciprocal relationships in an SNG, which suggests the existence of mechanisms for generating reliable, low-cost signals in human evolution.Comment: 13 pages, 2 figure

Sex-specific association patterns in bonobos and chimpanzees reflect species differences in cooperation

In several group-living species, individuals' social preferences are thought to be influenced by cooperation. For some societies with fission–fusion dynamics, sex-specific association patterns reflect sex differences in cooperation in within- and between-group contexts. In our study, we investigated this hypothesis further by comparing sex-specific association patterns in two closely related species, chimpanzees and bonobos, which differ in the level of between-group competition and in the degree to which sex and kinship influence dyadic cooperation. Here, we used long-term party composition data collected on five chimpanzee and two bonobo communities and assessed, for each individual of 10 years and older, the sex of its top associate and of all conspecifics with whom it associated more frequently than expected by chance. We found clear species differences in association patterns. While in all chimpanzee communities males and females associated more with same-sex partners, in bonobos males and females tended to associate preferentially with females, but the female association preference for other females is lower than in chimpanzees. Our results also show that, for bonobos (but not for chimpanzees), association patterns were predominantly driven by mother–offspring relationships. These species differences in association patterns reflect the high levels of male–male cooperation in chimpanzees and of mother–son cooperation in bonobos. Finally, female chimpanzees showed intense association with a few other females, and male chimpanzees showed more uniform association across males. In bonobos, the most differentiated associations were from males towards females. Chimpanzee male association patterns mirror fundamental human male social traits and, as in humans, may have evolved as a response to strong between-group competition. The lack of such a pattern in a closely related species with a lower degree of between-group competition further supports this notion

Postcopulatory sexual selection

The female reproductive tract is where competition between the sperm of different males takes place, aided and abetted by the female herself. Intense postcopulatory sexual selection fosters inter-sexual conflict and drives rapid evolutionary change to generate a startling diversity of morphological, behavioural and physiological adaptations. We identify three main issues that should be resolved to advance our understanding of postcopulatory sexual selection. We need to determine the genetic basis of different male fertility traits and female traits that mediate sperm selection; identify the genes or genomic regions that control these traits; and establish the coevolutionary trajectory of sexes