2,310 research outputs found

    Skin microvascular vasodilatory capacity in offspring of two parents with Type 2 diabetes

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    Aims<br/> Microvascular dysfunction occurs in Type 2 diabetes and in subjects with fasting hyperglycaemia. It is unclear whether this dysfunction relates to dysglycaemia. This study investigated in normogylcaemic individuals whether a genetic predisposition to diabetes, or indices of insulin resistance including endothelial markers, were associated with impaired microvascular function.<br/> Methods<br/> Maximum microvascular hyperaemia to local heating of the skin was measured using laser Doppler flowmetry in 21 normoglycaemic subjects with no family history of diabetes (Group 1) and 21 normoglycaemic age, sex and body mass index-matched offspring of two parents with Type 2 diabetes (Group 2). <br/>Results<br/> Although Group 2 had normal fasting plasma glucose and glucose tolerance tests, the 120-min glucose values were significantly higher at 6.4 (5.3-6.6) mmol/l (median (25th-75th centile)) than the control group at 4.9 (4.6-5.9) mmol/l (P=0.005) and the insulinogenic index was lower at 97.1 (60.9-130.8) vs. 124.0 (97.2-177.7) (P=0.027). Skin maximum microvascular hyperaemia (Group 1: 1.56 (1.39- 1.80) vs. Group 2: 1.53 (1.30-1.98) V, P=0.99) and minimum microvascular resistance which normalizes the hyperaemia data for blood pressure (Group 1: 52.0 (43.2-67.4) vs. Group 2: 56.0 (43.7-69.6) mmHgN, P=0.70) did not differ in the two groups. Significant positive associations occurred between minimum microvascular resistance and indices of the insulin resistance syndrome; plasminogen activator inhibitor type 1 (R-s=0.46, P=0.003), t-PA (R-s=0.36, P=0.03), total cholesterol (R-s=0.35, P=0.02), and triglyceride concentration (R-s=0.35, P=0.02), and an inverse association with insulin sensitivity (R-s=-0.33, P=0.03).<br/> Conclusions<br/> In normoglycaemic adults cutaneous microvascular vasodilatory capacity is associated with features of insulin resistance syndrome, particularly with plasminogen activator inhibitor type 1. A strong family history of Type 2 diabetes alone does not result in impairment in the maximum hyperaemic response

    The Functions of The County Superintendent of Public Instruction In The State of Kansas

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    The purpose of this study is to reveal the true status of the present incumbents in the offices of county superintendent of public instruction in Kansas. This involves three problems: first, to show the age, sex, salary, tenure of office, and the qualifications; second , to show the duties of the county superintendent and the distribution of time allotted to each; and, third, to show the methods, the objectives, and the outcomes of supervision

    Intersection between metabolic dysfunction, high fat diet consumption, and brain aging

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    Deleterious neurochemical, structural, and behavioral alterations are a seemingly unavoidable aspect of brain aging. However, the basis for these alterations, as well as the basis for the tremendous variability in regards to the degree to which these aspects are altered in aging individuals, remains to be elucidated. An increasing number of individuals regularly consume a diet high in fat, with high‐fat diet consumption known to be sufficient to promote metabolic dysfunction, although the links between high‐fat diet consumption and aging are only now beginning to be elucidated. In this review we discuss the potential role for age‐related metabolic disturbances serving as an important basis for deleterious perturbations in the aging brain. These data not only have important implications for understanding the basis of brain aging, but also may be important to the development of therapeutic interventions which promote successful brain aging.Fil: Uranga, Romina Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Bahía Blanca. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Bahía Blanca; ArgentinaFil: Bruce Keller, Annadora J.. State University of Louisiana; Estados UnidosFil: Morrison, Christopher D.. State University of Louisiana; Estados UnidosFil: Fernandez Kim, Sun Ok. State University of Louisiana; Estados UnidosFil: Ebenezer, Philip J.. State University of Louisiana; Estados UnidosFil: Zhang, Le. State University of Louisiana; Estados UnidosFil: Dasuri, Kalavathi. State University of Louisiana; Estados UnidosFil: Keller, Jeffrey N.. State University of Louisiana; Estados Unido

    Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt Write-Down and Public Recovery

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    Most public discussion of the world’s continuing financial and macroeconomic troubles focuses rightly on debt. It focuses wrongly, however, on public debt. The real source of our ills is global-trade-related private debt overhang among millions of households below the top of the wealth distribution in the “developed” world. That is the provenance of both (a) the asset price bubbles and busts in whose aftermath we still struggle, and (b) the fact that we’re still struggling. Public sector debt growth in the developed world since 2009 is merely a symptom – the product of thus far failed treatment – of this fundamental condition. In sum, then, we are now living with over three decades’ postponed secular stagnation on the part of the global middle class and the economies whose growth they once fueled, the destructive consequences of which we simply put off to, and accordingly concentrated into, the present moment. This is why times are so tough and so volatile. What then to do? Relative to the state of the public discussion, the answer is lamentably obvious. In the immediate term, private debt must be massively restructured and largely forgiven on a scale commensurate with those asset price plummets that were the crash. In the longer term, the structural conditions that render us debt-dependent have to be radically, even if incrementally, altered, while financial regulation for its part must become forthrightly macroprudential in character. This is the only sustainable way to eliminate our now crippling private debt overhang and prevent a recurrence. The only alternatives are intolerable: (a) continuing slump, with all of the waste and continuing tragedy it entails; or (b) further asset price bubbles and busts, of the sort in which all efforts to pare overhang artificially from the asset side of the balance sheet alone – e.g., through non-supplemented monetary policy – ultimately issue. This paper aims to head-off these intolerable alternatives. It begins by elaborating more fully on the role played by inequality and private debt in fomenting financial crisis and then underwriting post-crisis slump, first modeling the mechanism through which this occurs, then empirically corroborating the presence and operation of this mechanism in the nation’s most devastating bubbles, busts, and ensuing deflations. The paper then documents the magnitude of that post-bubble private debt overhang with which we now struggle. It shows that this overhang is by far the most salient cause of our ongoing troubles. The paper then turns to elaborating a full menu of shorter and longer term policy actions that must be taken to eliminate private debt overhang and restore healthy growth to the macroeconomy. These include carefully integrated debt write-down, capital-ownership-spreading, finance-regulatory, and global currency reform measures

    Evidence for the h_b(1P) meson in the decay Upsilon(3S) --> pi0 h_b(1P)

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    Using a sample of 122 million Upsilon(3S) events recorded with the BaBar detector at the PEP-II asymmetric-energy e+e- collider at SLAC, we search for the hb(1P)h_b(1P) spin-singlet partner of the P-wave chi_{bJ}(1P) states in the sequential decay Upsilon(3S) --> pi0 h_b(1P), h_b(1P) --> gamma eta_b(1S). We observe an excess of events above background in the distribution of the recoil mass against the pi0 at mass 9902 +/- 4(stat.) +/- 2(syst.) MeV/c^2. The width of the observed signal is consistent with experimental resolution, and its significance is 3.1sigma, including systematic uncertainties. We obtain the value (4.3 +/- 1.1(stat.) +/- 0.9(syst.)) x 10^{-4} for the product branching fraction BF(Upsilon(3S)-->pi0 h_b) x BF(h_b-->gamma eta_b).Comment: 8 pages, 4 postscript figures, submitted to Phys. Rev. D (Rapid Communications

    Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt Write-Down and Public Recovery

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    Most public discussion of the world’s continuing financial and macroeconomic troubles focuses rightly on debt. It focuses wrongly, however, on public debt. The real source of our ills is global-trade-related private debt overhang among millions of households below the top of the wealth distribution in the “developed” world. That is the provenance of both (a) the asset price bubbles and busts in whose aftermath we still struggle, and (b) the fact that we’re still struggling. Public sector debt growth in the developed world since 2009 is merely a symptom – the product of thus far failed treatment – of this fundamental condition. In sum, then, we are now living with over three decades’ postponed secular stagnation on the part of the global middle class and the economies whose growth they once fueled, the destructive consequences of which we simply put off to, and accordingly concentrated into, the present moment. This is why times are so tough and so volatile. What then to do? Relative to the state of the public discussion, the answer is lamentably obvious. In the immediate term, private debt must be massively restructured and largely forgiven on a scale commensurate with those asset price plummets that were the crash. In the longer term, the structural conditions that render us debt-dependent have to be radically, even if incrementally, altered, while financial regulation for its part must become forthrightly macroprudential in character. This is the only sustainable way to eliminate our now crippling private debt overhang and prevent a recurrence. The only alternatives are intolerable: (a) continuing slump, with all of the waste and continuing tragedy it entails; or (b) further asset price bubbles and busts, of the sort in which all efforts to pare overhang artificially from the asset side of the balance sheet alone – e.g., through non-supplemented monetary policy – ultimately issue. This paper aims to head-off these intolerable alternatives. It begins by elaborating more fully on the role played by inequality and private debt in fomenting financial crisis and then underwriting post-crisis slump, first modeling the mechanism through which this occurs, then empirically corroborating the presence and operation of this mechanism in the nation’s most devastating bubbles, busts, and ensuing deflations. The paper then documents the magnitude of that post-bubble private debt overhang with which we now struggle. It shows that this overhang is by far the most salient cause of our ongoing troubles. The paper then turns to elaborating a full menu of shorter and longer term policy actions that must be taken to eliminate private debt overhang and restore healthy growth to the macroeconomy. These include carefully integrated debt write-down, capital-ownership-spreading, finance-regulatory, and global currency reform measures

    Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt Write-Down and Public Recovery

    Get PDF
    Most public discussion of the world’s continuing financial and macroeconomic troubles focuses rightly on debt. It focuses wrongly, however, on public debt. The real source of our ills is global-trade-related private debt overhang among millions of households below the top of the wealth distribution in the “developed” world. That is the provenance of both (a) the asset price bubbles and busts in whose aftermath we still struggle, and (b) the fact that we’re still struggling. Public sector debt growth in the developed world since 2009 is merely a symptom – the product of thus far failed treatment – of this fundamental condition. In sum, then, we are now living with over three decades’ postponed secular stagnation on the part of the global middle class and the economies whose growth they once fueled, the destructive consequences of which we simply put off to, and accordingly concentrated into, the present moment. This is why times are so tough and so volatile. What then to do? Relative to the state of the public discussion, the answer is lamentably obvious. In the immediate term, private debt must be massively restructured and largely forgiven on a scale commensurate with those asset price plummets that were the crash. In the longer term, the structural conditions that render us debt-dependent have to be radically, even if incrementally, altered, while financial regulation for its part must become forthrightly macroprudential in character. This is the only sustainable way to eliminate our now crippling private debt overhang and prevent a recurrence. The only alternatives are intolerable: (a) continuing slump, with all of the waste and continuing tragedy it entails; or (b) further asset price bubbles and busts, of the sort in which all efforts to pare overhang artificially from the asset side of the balance sheet alone – e.g., through non-supplemented monetary policy – ultimately issue. This paper aims to head-off these intolerable alternatives. It begins by elaborating more fully on the role played by inequality and private debt in fomenting financial crisis and then underwriting post-crisis slump, first modeling the mechanism through which this occurs, then empirically corroborating the presence and operation of this mechanism in the nation’s most devastating bubbles, busts, and ensuing deflations. The paper then documents the magnitude of that post-bubble private debt overhang with which we now struggle. It shows that this overhang is by far the most salient cause of our ongoing troubles. The paper then turns to elaborating a full menu of shorter and longer term policy actions that must be taken to eliminate private debt overhang and restore healthy growth to the macroeconomy. These include carefully integrated debt write-down, capital-ownership-spreading, finance-regulatory, and global currency reform measures
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