Science as a Self-Organizing Meta-Information System

Four basic problems that a theory of science has to deal with concern epistemology, structure, causality, and dynamics of science. These problems deal with the relationship of induction/deduction, actors/structures, internal/external factors, and continuity/discontinuity. Traditionally they have been solved one-sidedly. Considering science as a self-organizing system allows a more integrative approach. Science is a complex, nonlinear system that is made up of two moments: scientific actors and scientific structures. Scientific self-organization operates synchronously and diachronically. Synchronous scientific self-organization is a mutual production process between scientific actors and structures. Scientific systems are self-organizing units that perform the production of theories and truths by the way of a productive, circular causal duality of scientific actors and scientific structures. Science is a dynamic system where research practices produce and reproduce structures that produce and reproduce research practices. Scientific structures are medium and outcome of scientific actions. At the action level one can find a systemic hierarchy that is made up of individual researchers, research groups, scientific communities, and the overall scientific community. Scientific structures include theories, research institutions, technologies, journals, publications, science funds; norms, values, and rules of scientific conduct. The main scientific practices can be categorized as genuinely scientific practices (innovation, dissemination, scientific interchange, funding-related activities, teaching), cultural practices (public discourse), political practices (science policy), and economic practices (action related to scientific knowledge as commodities, patents, science-industry-partnerships, sponsorship). Science is an open system that is structurally coupled to other subsystems of society, it is neither internally, nor externally determined, its development is caused by a complex interplay of internal and external factors, it is a relatively autonomous system. Systems in nature and society act as a sort of data for the scientific system, research processes establish an informational relationship between the scientific system and its environment in the sense that theories are complex, non-linear reflections of environmental processes. Due to the fact that all complex systems are informational, one can say that science produces information about information systems. Science is a 2nd order information system, it produces meta-information. Philosophy of science is a science of science, it produces information about information about information, it is a 3rd order information system. The metaphor of science as a grand hypertext refers to the self-referential character of scientific texts. A scientific text by the way of citation refers to other scientific texts, it incorporates part of the history of science, and methodologically discusses other texts. The formation of scientific knowledge can be described as a double-process of induction and deduction, abstraction and concretization, where scientific knowledge consists of both empirical knowledge and theoretical knowledge and is formed in loop that consists of two self-organization processes. The self-organization of scientific knowledge is a mutually productive relationship between experience and theory. Scientific knowledge is a unity of experience and theory. The self-organization of scientific knowledge is a dialectical cycle where signals from material reality are transformed into experienced data that is interpreted and results in hypotheses and theories which are transformed into methods and technologies that are employed in order to cause effects in material reality that can again be observed as data. In this self-organization process there is the bottom-up-emergence of theoretical knowledge and the top-down-emergence of experiences and material effects. Each scientific theory is a truth claim, but one that is based on a systematic methodology, permanent evaluation and correction, and conflict-based discourse. Hence scientific truths are not absolute truths, they are truths-in-question, truths-in-discourse, and truths-in-conflict, and truths-in-development. One can distinguish formal, adequate, discursive, and practical truth of a theory. Due to the fact that the knowledge-based society is a high risk society, practical truth of science in the form of an ethically responsible science is of central importance. Diachronic self-organization of science means that dominant scientific paradigms at some point of time loose their effectiveness, paradoxes and instabilities show up, science enters crisis, a new dominant paradigm emerges. If a large gap between scientific theory and the problems posed for science by itself and by society emerges, the dominant structural patterns are increasingly questioned. This can have scientific or wider societal causes, or a combination of both. The resulting crisis is a process of creation and destruction. The whole process is one of the emergence of scientific order from noise. Variation is a permanent phenomenon of scientific evolution, but in phases of instability where the self-organization of science shifts from self-reproduction to order from noise the degree of variation and development by chance is much larger

Polyphasic Analysis of Intraspecific Diversity in Epicoccum nigrum Warrants Reclassification into Separate Species

BACKGROUND: Epicoccum nigrum Link (syn. E. purpurascens Ehrenb. ex Schlecht) is a saprophytic ascomycete distributed worldwide which colonizes a myriad of substrates. This fungus has been known as a biological control agent for plant pathogens and produces a variety of secondary metabolites with important biological activities as well as biotechnological application. E. nigrum produces darkly pigmented muriform conidia on short conidiophores on sporodochia and is a genotypically and phenotypically highly variable species. Since different isolates identified as E. nigrum have been evaluated as biological control agents and used for biocompound production, it is highly desirable that this species name refers to only one lineage. However, according to morphological and genetic variation, E. nigrum present two genotypes that may comprise more than one species. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We report the application of combined molecular (ITS and β-tubulin gene sequence analysis, PCR-RFLP and AFLP techniques), morphometric, physiological, genetic compatibility and recombination analysis to study the taxonomic relationships within an endophytic population that has been identified as E. nigrum. This combined analysis established two genotypes showing morphological, physiological and genetic divergence as well as genetic incompatibility characterized by colony inhibition, strongly indicating that these genotypes correspond to different species. Genotype 1 corresponds to E. nigrum while genotype 2 represents a new species, referred to in this study as Epicoccum sp. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: This research contributes to the knowledge of the Epicoccum genus and asserts that the classification of E. nigrum as a single variable species should be reassessed. In fact, based on the polyphasic approach we suggest the occurrence of cryptic species within E. nigrum and also that many of the sequences deposited as E. nigrum in GenBank and culture collection of microbial strains should be reclassified, including the reference strain CBS 161.73 sequenced in this work. In addition, this study provides valuable tools for differentiation of Epicoccum species

Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment

Since the modern era, the discourse of punishment has cycled through three sets of questions. The first, born of the Enlightenment itself, asked: On what ground does the sovereign have the right to punish? Nietzsche most forcefully, but others as well, argued that the question itself begged its own answer. The right to punish, they suggested, is what defines sovereignty, and as such, can never serve to limit sovereign power. With the birth of the social sciences, this skepticism gave rise to a second set of questions: What then is the true function of punishment? What is it that we do when we punish? From Durkheim to the Frankfurt School to Michel Foucault, 20th century moderns explored social organization, economic production, political legitimacy, and the construction of the self – turning punishment practices upside down, dissecting not only their repressive functions but more importantly their role in constructing society and the contemporary subject. A series of further critiques – of meta-narratives, of functionalism, of scientific objectivity – softened this second line of inquiry and helped shape a third set of questions: What does punishment tell us about ourselves and our culture? What is the cultural meaning of our punishment practices? These three sets of questions set the contours of our modern discourse on crime and punishment. What happens now – now that we have seen what lies around the cultural bend and realize that the same critiques apply with equal force to any interpretation of social meaning that we could possibly read into our contemporary punishment practices? Should we continue to labor on this third and final set of questions, return to an earlier set, or, as all our predecessors did, craft a new line of inquiry? What question shall we – children of the 21st century – pose of our punishment practices and institutions? In this essay, I argue that we should abandon the misguided project of modernity, recognize once and for all the limits of reason, and turn instead to randomization and chance. In all the modern texts, there always came this moment when the empirical facts ran out or the deductions of principle reached their limit – or both – and yet the reasoning continued. There was always this moment, ironically, when the moderns took a leap of faith. And it was always there, at that precise moment, that we learned the most: that we could read from the text and decipher a vision of just punishment that was never entirely rational, never purely empirical, and never fully determined by the theoretical premises of the author. In each and every case, the modern text let slip a leap of faith – an ethical choice about how to resolve a gap, an ambiguity, an indeterminacy in an argument of principle or fact. Rather than continue to take these leaps of faith, I urge us to recognize the critical limits of reason and, whenever we reach them, to rely instead on randomization. Where our facts run out, where our principles no longer guide us, we should leave the decision-making to the coin toss, the roll of the dice, the lottery draw – in sum, to chance. This essay begins to explore what that would mean in the field of crime and punishment