Inefficiencies in regional commuting policy.

This paper discusses investments in transport infrastructure and incentives for commuting taxes in a multiregional setting. We study the horizontal and vertical interactions between governments. We identify incentives for strategic and tax exporting behavior that might lead to underinvestment in transport infrastructure. Furthermore, we show that the intensity of the strategic behavior is affected by geographic firm ownership structure, the number of labor-supplying regions and the revenue-sharing mechanism in the federation. A numerical example applies the insights on commuting in Belgium.

Efficiency and equity aspects of energy taxation

We analyse the distributional effects of increased oil excises in Belgium by combining a regional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with a microsimulation framework that exploits the rich detail of household-level data. The results suggest that policymakers face an equity-efficiency trade-off driven by the choice of revenue recycling options. Regional impact variation appears to be substantial

Regional government competition and incentives for commuting taxes and transport investments

This paper discusses incentives for investments in transport infrastructure and commuting subsidies in a multi-region framework. Responsibilities of fiscal treatment of commuting expenses, public provision of road infrastructure and road pricing are distributed among different levels of government. The incentives of governments are discussed in a setting with commuting from a peripheral, less productive area to an urban agglomeration or city center. The interactions between investment in transport infrastructure, road pricing and commuting subsidies are analyzed. First, the optimal number of commuters from the point of view of the federation is derived in a first best situation. When a tax on labor is levied to finance the investment in transportation, a commuting subsidy can correct the labor tax distortion and the first best outcome can be obtained. However, when the peripheral region is in control of the transport policy and perceives its position as a dominant supplier of labor, the regional government will have an incentive to strategically restrict the number of commuters. This will lead to a commuting tax. In addition, there will be underinvestment in infrastructure investment. The city government faces different incentives. On the one hand, profits made in the city increase with the commuting flow. Assuming profits are captured locally, the city thus benefits from a higher number of commuters. On the other hand, the city can raise tax revenues by taxing commuters. Therefore, tax exporting behavior can be one of the drivers of the city’s transport policy. The result is a situation where the city invests in transport infrastructure to attract commuters and sets a tax on commuters to raise government revenues. We show that the intensity of the regional strategic behavior is affected by firm ownership structure, the number of labor-supplying regions and the revenue-sharing mechanism in the federation. The paper also looks into vertical tax competition and identifies possibilities for the federal government to correct the incentive structure through mechanism design. A numerical example illustrates the insights for commuting in Belgium.

Efficiency and equity aspects of energy taxation

We analyse the distributional effects of increased oil excises in Belgium by combining a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with the EUROMOD microsimulation framework that exploits the rich detail of household-level data. The link between the CGE model and the micro level is top-down, feeding changes in commodity prices, factor returns and employment by sector into a non-behavioural microsimulation. The results suggest that policymakers face an equity-efficiency trade-off driven by the choice of revenue recycling options. Distributional effects of the environmental tax reform appear to depend strongly on changes in factor prices and welfare payments

Regional government competition and incentives for commuting taxes and transport investments

This paper discusses incentives for investments in transport infrastructure and commuting subsidies in a multi-region framework. Responsibilities of fiscal treatment of commuting expenses, public provision of road infrastructure and road pricing are distributed among different levels of government. The incentives of governments are discussed in a setting with commuting from a peripheral, less productive area to an urban agglomeration or city center. The interactions between investment in transport infrastructure, road pricing and commuting subsidies are analyzed. First, the optimal number of commuters from the point of view of the federation is derived in a first best situation. When a tax on labor is levied to finance the investment in transportation, a commuting subsidy can correct the labor tax distortion and the first best outcome can be obtained. However, when the peripheral region is in control of the transport policy and perceives its position as a dominant supplier of labor, the regional government will have an incentive to strategically restrict the number of commuters. This will lead to a commuting tax. In addition, there will be underinvestment in infrastructure investment. The city government faces different incentives. On the one hand, profits made in the city increase with the commuting flow. Assuming profits are captured locally, the city thus benefits from a higher number of commuters. On the other hand, the city can raise tax revenues by taxing commuters. Therefore, tax exporting behavior can be one of the drivers of the city's transport policy. The result is a situation where the city invests in transport infrastructure to attract commuters and sets a tax on commuters to raise government revenues. We show that the intensity of the regional strategic behavior is affected by firm ownership structure, the number of labor-supplying regions and the revenue-sharing mechanism in the federation. The paper also looks into vertical tax competition and identifies possibilities for the federal government to correct the incentive structure through mechanism design. A numerical example illustrates the insights for commuting in Belgium

Weak-Field Gravity of Circular Cosmic Strings

A weak-field solution of Einstein's equations is constructed. It is generated by a circular cosmic string externally supported against collapse. The solution exhibits a conical singularity, and the corresponding deficit angle is the same as for a straight string of the same linear energy density. This confirms the deficit-angle assumption made in the Frolov-Israel-Unruh derivation of the metric describing a string loop at a moment of time symmetry.Comment: 15 page

Impact of low oil prices on the EU economy

The report describes the importance of oil for the EU economy and analyses the potential economic effects that current low oil prices since mid-2014 may have in the EU28 economy. Further it assesses how the current oil price decrease may evolve up to 2020 and the consequences for global oil consumption. The analysis shows that a decrease of the oil price from US$100 to US$50 may lead to a GDP gain of about 0.7%, both on a global level and in the EU28, driven by private consumption and investment. The global gains are not evenly distributed. Net oil importing countries gain, whereas oil exporting countries lose. The analysis mainly focuses on the EU28 and it shows that the more oil-intensive countries and sectors gain more than the rest of the economy. A 50% decrease of the oil price may generate up to 3 million additional jobs (1.3% of the total labour force). Interestingly, oil-intensive sectors do not necessarily improve their competitiveness vis-à-vis their competitors in other regions, as non-EU producers may be less energy efficient and therefore benefit more from low oil prices.JRC.J.1-Economics of Climate Change, Energy and Transpor

The Sun's position in the sky

We express the position of the Sun in the sky as a function of time and the observer's geographic coordinates. Our method is based on applying rotation matrices to vectors describing points on the celestial sphere. We also derive direct expressions, as functions of date of the year and geographic latitude, for the duration of daylight, the maximum and minimum altitudes of the Sun, and the cardinal directions to sunrise and sunset. We discuss how to account for the eccentricity of the earth's orbit, the precessions of the equinoxes and the perihelion, the size of the solar disk, and atmospheric refraction. We illustrate these results by computing the dates of "Manhattanhenge" (when sunset aligns with the east-west streets on the main traffic grid for Manhattan, in New York City), by plotting the altitude of the Sun over representative cities as a function of time, and by showing plots ("analemmas") for the position of the Sun in the sky at a given hour of the day.Comment: 19 pages, 16 figures. v3: Replaced to match published version and to re-package Mathematica notebook as an ancillary fil

Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2017: How climate policies improve air quality

This study shows that achieving the climate change mitigation target of staying below 2°C temperature rise is possible technically – thanks to an acceleration of decarbonisation trends, an increased electrification of final demand and large changes in the primary energy mix that include a phase out of coal and a reduction of oil and gas – and is consistent with economic growth. It yields co-benefits via improved air quality – including avoided deaths, reduction of respiratory diseases and agricultural productivity improvement – that largely offset the cost of climate change mitigation. These co-benefits arise without extra investment costs and are additional to the benefits of avoiding global warming and its impact on the economy.JRC.C.6-Economics of Climate Change, Energy and Transpor