The Economics of Internet Search

This lecture provides an introduction to the economics of Internet search engines. After a brief review of the historical development of the technology and the industry, I describe some of the economic features of the auction system used for displaying ads. It turns out that some relatively simple economic models provide significant insight into the operation of these auctions. In particular, the classical theory of two-sided matching markets turns out to be very useful in this context.

The economics of Edwardian imperial preference: what can New Zealand reveal?

In the Edwardian era, the British Dominions adopted policies of imperial preference, amid a period of rising imports from the United States and industrial Continental Europe. Hitherto, there has been no econometric assessment of whether these policies produced an intra-Empire trade diversion, as intended. This paper focuses on New Zealand’s initial policy of imperial preference, codified in the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903. New Zealand’s policy was unique insofar as it extended preference to only certain commodities. Using a commodity panel regression, this paper exploits the cross-commodity variation in the extension of preference, but finds no statistically significant effect of preference on either the Empire share or, specifically, the British share of New Zealand’s imports. This finding is corroborated by an alternative empirical approach involving propensity-score matching

The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP

Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the optimal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists such a valuation function that both is individually rational and is minimum (that is, it is component-wise dominated by any other individually rational, virtual valuation function that approximately fits the data). Similarly, given upper bound constraints on the valuation function, we show how to fit the maximum virtual valuation function with the optimal additive rationality guarantee. In practice, revealed preference bidding constraints are very demanding. We explain how approximate rationality can be used to create relaxed revealed preference constraints in an auction. We then show how combinatorial methods can be used to implement these relaxed constraints. Worst/best-case welfare guarantees that result from the use of such mechanisms can be quantified via the minimum/maximum virtual valuation function

Economic FAQs About the Internet

This is a set of Frequently Asked Questions (and answers) about the economic, institutional, and technological structure of the Internet. We describe the history and current state of the Internet, discuss some of the pressing economic and regulatory problems, and speculate about future developments.Internet, telecommunications, congestion pricing, National Information Infrastructure

Are there Psychological Barriers in the Dow-Jones Index?

The popular press attaches particular significance to certain numerical values of the Dow-Jones index. These magic numbers are referred to as `resistance levels' or `psychological barriers.' We examine 38 years of closing values of this index to see if it is of any help in predicting future stock market returns.Dow-Jones index, psychological barriers, resistance levels, market efficiency

The Attack-and-Defense Group Contests: Best-shot versus Weakest-link

This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest-link whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best-shot impact function. We fully characterize the Nash and coalition-proof equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the coalition-proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free-ride completely on a group-member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition-proof equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best-shot or a weakest-link but the other group follows an additive impact function

Contidioning Prices on Purchase History

Many transactions are now computer mediated, making it possible for sellers to condition their pricing on the history of interactions with individual consumers. This paper investigates conditions under which price conditioning will or will not be used. Our simplest model involves rational consumers with constant valuations for the good being sold and a monopoly seller who can commit to a pricing policy. In this framework, the seller will not find it profitable to condition pricing on past behavior. We consider various generalizations of this model, such as allowing the seller to offer enhanced services to previous customers, making the seller unable to commit to a pricing policy, and allowing competition in the marketplace. All of these generalizations have equilibria with price conditioning.Price discrimination, Price conditioning, Privacy, Ecommerce

A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries

Summary Economic theory has attempted to identify the conditions under which corruption has particularly harmful effects. This article evaluates these theories and argues that the classifications offered are misleading. Very successful interventionist states have suffered from corruption just as much as very unsuccessful ones. Policy responses to corruption require an understanding of the effects of corruption and the determinants of these effects. The fact which appears to have a strong effect in determining the harmfulness of corruption is the balance of power between the state and its clients. An alternative classification of the effects of corruption is suggested on this basis

¿Para qué se estudia la teoría económica?

En este trabajo se examinan varios planteamientos que tienen en cuenta que la economía es una ciencia política, de forma que se plantean argumentos acerca de cómo la teoría económica puede ser de utilidad a la política. La lista de ejemplos sin duda es incompleta pero es de utilidad para enfocar la discusión acerca de cómo la teoría económica contribuye al trabajo de los economistas.

The revealed comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain

This paper calculates indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) for 17 British manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900. The resulting indicators show that the late-Victorian ‘workshop of the world’ was at a marked comparative disadvantage in a number of manufacturing industries. The paper then proceeds to identify the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages (disadvantages) using a fourfactor Heckscher-Ohlin model that relies upon these indicators. In contrast with previous scholarship, the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain were in the relatively labour nonintensive industries, and this pattern became more pronounced throughout the period. The paper concludes with the observation that the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages appear closer to those of the United States than had traditionally been thought