Unemployment insurance and duration of unemployment : evidence from Slovenia's transition

Between 1990 and 1992 in Slovenia, recipients of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits tended to remain (formally) unemployed until their benefits expired, before taking a job. Institutional set-up suggests, and labor surveys show, that many of the recipients were actually working while collecting UI benefits. In the spirit, if not in the letter of the law, the UI system was abused. The author shows that the escape rate of the recipients of unemployment compensation to employment increased dramatically just before the potential exhaustion of unemployment benefits - and decreased equally dramatically after benefits were exhausted. When grouped by the potential duration of benefits, unemployment length varies significantly. The unemployed with longer potential benefits stay unemployed longer. Because these groups differ in their characteristics (for example, in age), this does not prove the"waiting behavior"of the recipients. However, exits to employment dramatically increase just before exhaustion - and that does prove waiting behavior. The pattern of an increased escape rate just before benefits are exhausted and its dramatic fall thereafter is more rigorously demonstrated using hazard model estimation. Possibilities for informal employment are abundant in Slovenia, and the environment of transition economies generally seems conducive to misuse of the UI system. Legislative loopholes and failure to enforce the labor code allowed the unemployed to work and to collect benefits. The monitoring of job searches was also lax. The author's calculations suggest that reducing the duration of benefits would reduce the incidence of unemployment, its duration, the amount spent on UI benefits, and the inefficiencies generated by raising taxes to finance unemployment insurance. At the same time, reducing the duration of benefits would not impair job matches or crowd out jobs for nonrecipients. True, despite increased efficiency generally, the workers with the least job mobility might suffer hardships for the least mobile group and greater efficiency generally would have to be resolved in the political sphere. Redesigning the system for better targeting would be less controversial. One way to reduce UI spending without seriously curtailing incentives to work would be to reduce the benefits in proportion to earnings from irregular work. Another possibility is stricter monitoring of the job searches of the unemployed. To reduce spending and make"double dipping"less attractive, old-age insurance could be removed from the package of benefits the UI system offers. Also, counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (and who may thus develop a close relationship with them) should perhaps not be expected to be able to make impartial decisions about disqualifications for benefits; someone else should do that. In addition to better targeting, a"benefit transfer program"- a voluntary program that converts UI benefits Also, counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (through vouchers) into hiring subsidies - seems particularly attractive for Slovenia and other transition economies. In a way, such a program would legalize the"double-dipping"that has been taking place in Slovenia and possibly elsewhere. It would legalize practices that have undermined the system's credibility. But it might improve fiscal savings while sustaining the incentive to find jobs.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Public Health Promotion,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Youth and Governance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Markets,Social Protections&Assistance

The Armenian labor market in transition : issues and options

Reform of the labor market in the former Soviet Union (FSU) is essential to increase productivity. The transition of the FSU economies to a market economy must involve a massive displacement of workers, and will entail labor shortages for certain skills. A key challenge will be to reallocate labor at the lowest social costs. The authors identify key labor market issues in Armenia, reflecting on the dilemmas and options policymakers face both in Armenia and elsewhere in the FSU. Armenians are ardent advocates of radical reform and have already made progress in several areas (including successful privatization of land in 1990). But the Armenian transition is taking place in particularly unfavorable circumstances - including a severe energy crisis because of an economic blockade imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan. In Armenia, current labor policies represent a step in the right direction because they leave primary responsibility for finding a job to the individual. The state's role is simply to provide a social safety net and to create an environment that generates jobs. Tangible progress has been made but the adjustment process has just begun and is hindered by inconsistent labor policies - in some areas too radical and in others smacking of the old interventionism. The authors offer several general policy guidelines. Undertake several initiatives, not just one - possibly worker training as well as job search assistance, self employment grants, and temporary public employment. Use some resources to monitor and evaluate interventions to find out what works. Coordinate active policy interventions and the interface between active and passive instruments. Be prepared to change as the macroeconomic environment changes, and take advantage of the current climate. Under high inflation, for example, consider widening the wedge between wages and various cash and in-kind transfers. When inflation abates, consider paying cash benefits on the basis of prior earnings. Above all, be flexible and sensitive to signals and changes in signals. Among policy options, one size does not fit all.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Labor Standards,Health Monitoring&Evaluation

Does work pay in Slovenia?

Income transfers may generate work disincentives: if certain income payments are stopped when individuals (re)enter employment, this creates disincentives for taking employment – so called “unemployment trap”. To make work pay, several countries have introduced policies – financial incentives – which enhance employment opportunities for marginal groups in the labor market. Such policies increase in-work incomes and so improve work incentives for those receiving only out-of-work incomes. This paper tries to shed light on two questions, first being how does “making work pay” work in Slovenia, compared OECD countries, and the second, should Slovenia introduce earnings supplements or other in-work arrangements in tackling possible unemployment trap. According to international comparison Slovenia does not “step-out”, when we look at net replacement rates. Slovenia, however, has not introduced a single active labor programs that would stimulate directly and financially unemployed to join (official) employment, even though a lower paid job. In the paper we suggest the implementation of some kind of in-work arrangement at least for those, who are potentially less stimulated to reemploy.economic policy, financial incentives to work, Slovenia, EU, OECD.

Income support systems for the unemployed : issues and options

The report reviews the performance of various income support systems for the unemployed, and provides guidelines for developing and transition economies. It finds that: a) Unemployment insurance enables a high degree of consumption smoothing, performs well under various types of shocks, and acts as an automatic stabilizer. But it also creates reemployment disincentives, and wage pressure which increase the equilibrium unemployment rate, contributing to persistent unemployment. b) Unemployment assistance, while enabling more effective targeting, may not bring savings in comparison to unemployment insurance, and may well prove fiscally unsustainable. c) Unemployment insurance savings accounts, internalize the costs of unemployment benefits, and thus avoid the moral hazard inherent in traditional unemployment insurance, given the weak monitoring capacity of developing countries, an important advantage. d) Public works program is effective in reaching the poor, can attract informal sector workers, and provides flexible, fast responses to shocks. Despite its high non-wage costs, and possible stigmatization of participants, it is found suitable for developing countries, particularly as a complementary program. e) Severance pay offers few advantages - it adversely affects efficiency, produces high litigation costs, and offers limited risk-pooling.Environmental Economics&Policies,Rural Poverty Reduction,Safety Nets and Transfers,Services&Transfers to Poor,Health Economics&Finance

Live longer, work longer : making it happen in the labor market

The objective of the paper is to summarize labor market implications of population aging and to discuss policy options to increase the employment of old workers. The paper argues that population aging and ensuing shrinking of the workforce will create a significant drag on the economies of developed, transition, and even some developing countries. Thus working longer is an imperative: unless countered by productivity increases, working longer, or both, population aging and ensuing shrinking of labor force will reduce economic growth and may jeopardize the economic well-being of some of the elderly. However, extending working lives has proven difficult, both because workers do not want to work longer and because employers are lukewarm about employment old workers. Among measures to motivate workers to work longer, the paper proposes providing retirement incentives and attractive, flexible working arrangements; and to stimulate employers to hire old workers, it argues for removing obstacles imposed by restrictive labor market institutions, for increasing human capital of workers via life-long learning, and for addressing age discrimination. Chances for extending working lives will also increase with improving health of old workers. The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the implications of population aging for economic growth. Section 2 examines factors that stand in the way of longer working lives - why workers opt for early exit from the labor market, and why employers are often lukewarm about employing old workers. In the policy part of the paper, Section 3 proposes possible measures to attract workers to work longer, and Section 4 describes how to remove institutional obstacles and introduce incentives that would make old workers more appealing to employers.Labor Markets,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,,Labor Policies,Work&Working Conditions

Population aging and the labor market : the case of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka's population is predicted to age vary fast during the next 50 years, bringing a slowdown of labor force growth and after 2030its contraction. Based on a 2006 representative survey of old people in Sri Lanka, the paper examines labor market consequences of this process, focusing on retirement pathways and the determinants of labor market withdrawal. The paper finds that a vast majority of Sri Lankan old workers are engaged in the informal sector, work long hours, and are paid less than younger workers. Moreover, the paper shows that labor market duality carries over to old age: (i) previous employment is the most important predictor of the retirement pathway; (ii) older workers fall into two categories: civil servants and formal private sector workers, who generally stop working before they reach 60 because they are forced to do so by mandatory retirement regulations, and casual workers and the self-employed, who work until very old age (or death) due to poverty and insufficient income and who stop working primarily because of poor health; and (iii) the option of part-time work is used primarily by workers who held regular jobs in their prime age employment, but not by casual workers and self-employed.Labor Markets,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Policies,Work&Working Conditions,

How Changes in Benefits Entitlement Affect the Duration of Unemployment

This paper investigates the disincentive effects of the potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits.The disincentive effects are identified by exploiting changes in the UI system in Slovenia, which involved substantial reductions in the potential benefit duration and had characteristics of a "natural experiment".We find that the change had a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment - both to employment and to other destinations - at various durations of unemployment spells and for many categories of unemployed workers.Unemployment Insurance;potential benefit duration;job finding rates

Introducing Unemployment Insurance to Developing Countries

The paper identifies key labor market and institutional differences between developed and developing countries, analyzes how these differences affect the working of the standard, OECD-style unemployment insurance (UI) program, and derives a desirable design of unemployment benefit program in developing countries. It argues that these countries – faced by large informal sector, weak administrative capacity, large political risk, and environment prone to corruption – should tailor the OECD-style UI program to suit their circumstances. To minimize employment disincentives, to ensure affordability, and to minimize administration cots, such adaptations include: (i) relying on self-insurance (via unemployment insurance savings accounts – UISAs) as a main source of financing and complementing it by solidarity funding; (ii) simplifying monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status, and even eliminating personal monitoring of continuing eligibility requirements in the early phases; (iii) keeping modest benefits both in terms of the replacement rate and potential benefit duration; (iv) drawing on employers’ and workers’ contributions as sources of financing; and (v) piggybacking on existing networks to administer benefits. Particularly attractive is the UISAs-cum-borrowing version that uses pension wealth as collateral, making the system proof to moral hazard and strategic behavior, and allowing it to be rapidly deployed, such as in response to the currently emerging global economic crises.unemployment, unemployment insurance, unemployment insurance savings accounts

Worker Flows, Job Flows and Firm Wage Policies: An Analysis of Slovenia

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labor market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. We investigate the impact of the changing labor market for Slovenia using unique longitudinal matched employer-employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and links of the workers to the firms with whom they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and also are able to improve the match quality of its workers.Job Flows, Worker Flows, Wage Policies

How soft is the budget constraint for Yugoslav firms?

The purpose of this paper is to show that Yugoslav firms have also been subjected to massive, pervasive redistribution through a soft budget constraint. To quantify such redistribution, the authors focus particulary on the redistributive effects of holding financial assets and liabilities in an inflationary environment in which financial claims are generally not indexed. Analyzing firm-level data for Yugoslavia's manufacturing sector for 1986, they show that such flows, in contrast to those of other Eastern European economies, have been a far more important source of redistribution than taxes and subsidies. Although Yugoslavia's channels of redistribution differ significantly from those in other socialist economies, they share a common driving force: the pursuit of job and wage security. Producers of energy, food, and heavy manufactures, as well as less developed regions, have particulary benefited from the redistribution.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Public Sector Economics&Finance