The distribution of amorphous computer outputs

Fitness distributions (landscapes) of programs tend to a limit as they get bigger. Markov minorization gives upper bounds ((15.3 + 2.30m)/ log I) on the length of program run on random or average computing devices. I is the size of the instruction set and m size of output register. Almost all programs are constants. Convergence is exponential with 90% of programs of length 1.6 n2N yielding constants (n = size input register and size of memory = N). This is supported by experiment

Smarandache Non-Associative (SNA-) rings

In this paper we introduce the concept of Smarandache non-associative rings, which we shortly denote as SNA-rings as derived from the general definition of a Smarandache Structure (i.e., a set A embedded with a week structure W such that a proper subset B in A is embedded with a stronger structure S

Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard

This paper studies the issue of moral hazard in the presence of decentralized international risk sharing.In the model presented, risk sharing is achieved through macro markets (markets in which claims to the GDP of a country can be traded).Moral hazard arises for the following reason: if foreigners hold claims to domestic GDP due to risk sharing motives, the country will not receive the full benefit from its production anymore.This can motivate for example a tax on investment (which reduces production) or simply result in reduced governmental effort to increase productivity.We show in a two-country general equilibrium framework that the moral hazard problem does not lead to a reduction in the risk sharing (households hold half of world output).This results ultimately in a 100% tax on investment and creates a huge distortion.We conclude that unregulated macro markets pose a serious threat to world welfare.The analysis also raises concern about the desirability of decentralized risk sharing in general, in particular risk sharing through international trade of equity.moral hazard;international risk sharing

SMARANDACHE NEAR-RINGS AND THEIR GENERALIZATIONS

In this paper we study the Smarandache semi-near-ring and nearring, homomorphism, also the Anti-Smarandache semi-near-ring. We obtain some interesting results about them, give many examples, and pose some problems. We also define Smarandache semi-near-ring homomorphism

Web engineering security: essential elements

Security is an elusive target in today’s high-speed and extremely complex, Web enabled, information rich business environment. This paper presents the idea that there are essential, basic organizational elements that need to be identified, defined and addressed before examining security aspects of a Web Engineering Development process. These elements are derived from empirical evidence based on a Web survey and supporting literature. This paper makes two contributions. The first contribution is the identification of the Web Engineering specific elements that need to be acknowledged and resolved prior to the assessment of a Web Engineering process from a security perspective. The second contribution is that these elements can be used to help guide Security Improvement Initiatives in Web Engineering

Web development evolution: the assimilation of web engineering security

In today’s e-commerce environment, information is an incredibly valuable asset. Surveys indicate that companies are suffering staggering financial losses due to web security issues. Analyzing the underlying causes of these security breaches shows that a significant proportion of them are caused by straightforward design errors in systems and not by failures in security mechanisms. There is significant research into security mechanisms but there is little research into the integration of these into software design processes, even those processes specifically designed for Web Engineering. Security should be designed into the application development process upfront through an independent flexible methodology that contains customizable components

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. We show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.loan market competition;risk shifting;bank stability

MESHING NATURAL RESOURCE USE AND DEVELOPMENT WITH INCREASING URBANIZATION

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,