Towards a global climate constitution

In this paper my concern is the study of the incentives of individual countries to sign an international climate agreement that sets the terms of a climate constitution, that is, it establishes emission rights and rules for trading these rights to combat the climate problem effectively and efficiently

Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreement

Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations

This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiation

The inverse resonance problem for perturbations of algebro-geometric potentials

We prove that a compactly supported perturbation of a rational or simply periodic algebro-geometric potential of the one-dimensional Schr\"odinger equation on the half line is uniquely determined by the location of its Dirichlet eigenvalues and resonances.Comment: 14 page

Poverty, environment and natural resource use: introduction to the special issue

A growing population and growing per capita consumption threaten the environment and the natural resource base. Where natural resources are at risk, the livelihoods of many are at risk as well. In May 2006 the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group of Wageningen University organized a conference on `Poverty, Environment and Natural Resource Use¿ with the aim of contributing to a better understanding of the links between poverty and the natural resource base. The state of the environment affects people's living conditions ¿ and poverty affects environmental quality. Environmental policies cannot be designed and natural resources cannot be managed without appropriate consideration of local people's reactions to those policies and management decisions

Contractarian approaches to intergenerational justice: paper presented at the Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, June 1996 and at the annual meeting of the European Public Choice Society, Prague, April 1997

In modern political philosophy social contract theory is the most prominent approach to individual rights and fair institutions. According to social contract theory the system of rights in a society ought to be justified by reconstructing its basic features as a contract between the mutually unconcerned members of society. This paper explores whether social contract theory can successfully be applied to justify rights of future generations. Three competing views are analysed: Rawls's theory of justice, Hobbes's radical liberalism and Gauthier's bargaining framework based on the Lockean proviso

Sustainable freedom of choice: a new concept

The value concept of traditional resource economics is welfare. Therefore, sustainability of welfare is often taken to characterise our obligations to future generations. This paper argues that this view is inappropriate because it leaves no room for future generations autonomy. Future generations should be free to make their own decisions. Consequently freedom of choice is the appropriate value concept on which resource economics should be based. The concept of sustainability receives a new interpretation. Sustainability is a principle of intertemporal distributive justice which requires equitable opportunities across generations