Basic Action and Practical Knowledge

It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but mutually exclusive. On this view, practical reasoning and complex intentional action depend on skill and basic action, but the latter pair are not themselves rationally structured: the movements a basic action comprises are not intentional actions, and they are not structured as means to an end. However, Michael Thompson and Douglas Lavin have argued that action that bears no inner rational structure is not intentional action at all, and that therefore there can be no such thing as basic action. In this paper, I argue that their critique shows that standard conceptions of basic action are indeed untenable, but not that we can do without an alternative. I develop an alternative conception of skill and basic action on which their basicness is not to be equated with simplicity: like deliberation and non-basic action, they are teleologically complex, but their complexity takes a different form. On this view, skill contrasts with deliberation—not because it is not a manifestation of practical reason, but because the two are specifically different manifestations of practical reason

Journal for the history of analytical philosophy: Gilbert Ryle: intelligence, practice, skill, v. 5, no. 5

Special issue on Gilbert Ryle edited by Juliet Floyd and Lydia Patton. Articles: "Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and Theoretical Knowledge" by Julia Tanney; "Ryle’s “Intellectualist Legend” in Historical Context" by Michael Kremer; "Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism" by Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson; "Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How"by Will Small.https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/319Published versio

The Practicality of Practical Inference

In Intention, Anscombe says that practical reasoning is practical, not by virtue of its content, but rather by virtue of its form. But in her later essay ‘Practical Inference’, she seems to take this back, claiming instead that (1) the practicality of practical reasoning (or inference) resides in the distinctive use it makes of the premises, and (2) ‘it is a matter of indifference’ whether we say that it exemplifies a distinctive form. I aim to show that Anscombe is right about (1) but wrong about (2): the distinctive use (or teleology) of practical reasoning explains its distinctive formal features, and when the former is thought through, the latter are revealed to be more numerous and significant than Anscombe seems to recognize

“Getting out of downtown”: a longitudinal study of how street-entrenched youth attempt to exit an inner city drug scene

Background: Urban drug “scenes” have been identified as important risk environments that shape the health of street-entrenched youth. New knowledge is needed to inform policy and programing interventions to help reduce youths’ drug scene involvement and related health risks. The aim of this study was to identify how young people envisioned exiting a local, inner-city drug scene in Vancouver, Canada, as well as the individual, social and structural factors that shaped their experiences. Methods: Between 2008 and 2016, we draw on 150 semi-structured interviews with 75 street-entrenched youth. We also draw on data generated through ethnographic fieldwork conducted with a subgroup of 25 of these youth between. Results: Youth described that, in order to successfully exit Vancouver’s inner city drug scene, they would need to: (a) secure legitimate employment and/or obtain education or occupational training; (b) distance themselves – both physically and socially – from the urban drug scene; and (c) reduce their drug consumption. As youth attempted to leave the scene, most experienced substantial social and structural barriers (e.g., cycling in and out of jail, the need to access services that are centralized within a place that they are trying to avoid), in addition to managing complex individual health issues (e.g., substance dependence). Factors that increased youth’s capacity to successfully exit the drug scene included access to various forms of social and cultural capital operating outside of the scene, including supportive networks of friends and/or family, as well as engagement with addiction treatment services (e.g., low-threshold access to methadone) to support cessation or reduction of harmful forms of drug consumption. Conclusions: Policies and programming interventions that can facilitate young people’s efforts to reduce engagement with Vancouver’s inner-city drug scene are critically needed, including meaningful educational and/or occupational training opportunities, ‘low threshold’ addiction treatment services, as well as access to supportive housing outside of the scene.Medicine, Faculty ofOther UBCNon UBCMedicine, Department ofPopulation and Public Health (SPPH), School ofReviewedFacult