Σ[0] - Λ Mixing in QCD Sum Rules

Thesis (Ph. D. in Science)--University of Tsukuba, (A), no. 2848, 2002.3.25Includes bibliographical references"[0]" is superscrip

The developmental process of flood shoals based on observations in Toufutsu lake, Japan

Recently, the flood tidal sand bars have been developed at the entrance channel of Toufutsu Lake located along Okhotsk Sea in Hokkaido, and they affect flood control, inland water fisheries in lake, and so forth. In this study, we aimed to reveal the developmental process of sand bars by observations, which are velocity observation, water level observation, bed material investigation and video monitoring. Followings were major accomplishments of this study. (1) The maximum magnitude of reverse velocity at St.400 in the entrance channel during the periods of flood-tide was faster than that of normal velocity during the periods of ebb-tide. (2) The relationship between velocity at SP400 and friction velocity at SP400 during the periods of flood-tide is different from that during the periods of ebb-tide. (3) The\ud flood tidal sand bars at the entrance channel of Toufutsu Lake were developed by not only sea waves, but also adverse tidal current in the spring-tide

Possibility of \Lambda\Lambda pairing and its dependence on background density in relativistic Hartree-Bogoliubov model

We calculate a \Lambda\Lambda pairing gap in binary mixed matter of nucleons and \Lambda hyperons within the relativistic Hartree-Bogoliubov model. Lambda hyperons to be paired up are immersed in background nucleons in a normal state. The gap is calculated with a one-boson-exchange interaction obtained from a relativistic Lagrangian. It is found that at background density \rho_{N}=2.5\rho_{0} the \Lambda\Lambda pairing gap is very small, and that denser background makes it rapidly suppressed. This result suggests a mechanism, specific to mixed matter dealt with relativistic models, of its dependence on the nucleon density. An effect of weaker \Lambda\Lambda attraction on the gap is also examined in connection with revised information of the \Lambda\Lambda interaction.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, REVTeX 4; substantially rewritten, emphasis is put on the LL pairing in pure neutron matte

<特別寄稿>The Self Deflated

This is an expanded version of the talk, “A Deflationary Conception of the Self, ” which I gave at the conference, Aspects of Self: A Workshop, at Kyoto University on May 14, 2018.The first-person singular notion MYSELF is divided into two parts: ME and SELF. SELF is shown to be applicable to all sorts of things, not just human beings or persons, and analyzable in terms of the relations of anaphoric dependence and identity. The so-called problems of the self are recast as having little to do with SELF but as having everything to do with ME, and a version of adverbialism concerning so-called attitudes de se is offered

Differences of Tree-Breaking Patterns and Breaking Moment by Floods with Different Tree Ages and Substrate Condition under Two Flood Disturbances

Source: ICHE Conference Archive - https://mdi-de.baw.de/icheArchiv

Evaluation of Removal Condition of Invasive Plant 'Eragrostis Curvula' by Considering Erosion Rate

Source: ICHE Conference Archive - https://mdi-de.baw.de/icheArchiv

Impossible worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources