The Disadvantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures

This paper estimates the effect of a candidate’s incumbency status on his or her chances of winning using a large dataset on state legislative elections in India during 1975-2003. I use an innovative research design, called Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), that provides unbiased estimate of the effect due to incumbency by comparing the candidates in closely fought elections, and find that incumbency has a significant negative effect on the fortunes of incumbent candidates in India and the incumbency effect has decreased further in the last decade. Also, the variation in the incumbency effects across Indian states depends on the differences in levels of public good provision such as the health facilities, rates of employment and poverty, and state per capita income.Anti-incumbency; Indian elections; regression discontinuity design (RDD)

Estimation of the Incumbency Effects in the US State Legislatures: A Quasi-Experimental Approach

This paper estimates the incumbency effects in the legislative elections of 45 states in the US during the period 1968-89. I improve upon the existing measures of incumbency by using a quasi-experimental research design that isolates the effect due to incumbency from other contemporaneous factors such as candidate quality. I find that incumbency bestows a significant advantage on incumbents compared with their challengers. The incumbent candidates are about 30 percentage points more likely to win the next election and win 5.3 percentage point more votes than the challengers. However, the advantage is not as large as estimated from the previous methods.Incumbency; Elections; Regression Discontinuity

Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections

I examine the effect of legislative turnover on the size and composition of government expenditures in Indian state elections during 1980-2000. The paper finds that excessive turnover in Indian state elections results in an inefficient government expenditure policy. First, the higher the turnover, the larger is the size of government. Second, excessive turnover affects the allocative efficiency of the government expenditure by skewing the composition of government spending towards pure consumption expenditure and away from more productive investment expenditure. The findings imply that a lack of a proper commitment mechanism in political markets could be a source of inefficiency in government policy.Legislative turnover; Indian elections; government spending

Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures

An examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty U.S. states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short-sighted. Turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income. In particular, turnover increases capital expenditure and income taxes, both of which may cause long-run distortions in the economy. Further, increased turnover, by resulting in inefficient fiscal policy, reduces long-term economic growth.Government size; State finances; Political competition; Legislative turnover; Composition of spending; short-sighted behavior

Do Criminal Representatives Hinder or Improve Constituency Outcomes? Evidence from India

The recent increase in the number of criminally accused politicians elected to state assemblies has caused much furor in India. Despite the potentially important consequences and the widely divergent views, the implications of their elections to state legislative assemblies on constituency-level economic performance are unknown. Using a regression discontinuity design and data on the intensity of night lights in satellite imagery at the constituency level, our results suggest that the cost of electing criminally accused politicians on measures of economic activity is quite large. Using estimates of the elasticity of GDP to light, we find that the election of criminally accused candidates lead to roughly 5 percent lower GDP growth per year on average. These estimated costs increase for candidates with serious accusations, multiple accusations, and accusations regarding financial crimes. Our result survives variety of robustness checks

The Disadvantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures

This paper estimates the effect of a candidate’s incumbency status on his or her chances of winning using a large dataset on state legislative elections in India during 1975-2003. I use an innovative research design, called Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), that provides unbiased estimate of the effect due to incumbency by comparing the candidates in closely fought elections, and find that incumbency has a significant negative effect on the fortunes of incumbent candidates in India and the incumbency effect has decreased further in the last decade. Also, the variation in the incumbency effects across Indian states depends on the differences in levels of public good provision such as the health facilities, rates of employment and poverty, and state per capita income

Preferential trading areas: investment and welfare effects when countries differ in their size

This paper examines the investment and welfare effects of a preferential trading area (PTA) on member and non-member countries when countries differ in their relative size. I numerically solve a three-country and two-good model to characterize equilibria pertaining to investment diverting and creating effects of a preferential trade area. I conclude that welfare benefits of a preferential trade area are non-negative for the member countries, and could go either way for the non-member countries depending on their relative size. There exist equilibria which, given the parameter values and the relative size, result in welfare improvement in non-member countries

Preferential trading areas: investment and welfare effects when countries differ in their size

This paper examines the investment and welfare effects of a preferential trading area (PTA) on member and non-member countries when countries differ in their relative size. I numerically solve a three-country and two-good model to characterize equilibria pertaining to investment diverting and creating effects of a preferential trade area. I conclude that welfare benefits of a preferential trade area are non-negative for the member countries, and could go either way for the non-member countries depending on their relative size. There exist equilibria which, given the parameter values and the relative size, result in welfare improvement in non-member countries

Estimation of the Incumbency Effects in the US State Legislatures: A Quasi-Experimental Approach

This paper estimates the incumbency effects in the legislative elections of 45 states in the US during the period 1968-89. I improve upon the existing measures of incumbency by using a quasi-experimental research design that isolates the effect due to incumbency from other contemporaneous factors such as candidate quality. I find that incumbency bestows a significant advantage on incumbents compared with their challengers. The incumbent candidates are about 30 percentage points more likely to win the next election and win 5.3 percentage point more votes than the challengers. However, the advantage is not as large as estimated from the previous methods

Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections

I examine the effect of legislative turnover on the size and composition of government expenditures in Indian state elections during 1980-2000. The paper finds that excessive turnover in Indian state elections results in an inefficient government expenditure policy. First, the higher the turnover, the larger is the size of government. Second, excessive turnover affects the allocative efficiency of the government expenditure by skewing the composition of government spending towards pure consumption expenditure and away from more productive investment expenditure. The findings imply that a lack of a proper commitment mechanism in political markets could be a source of inefficiency in government policy