Specialized face perception mechanisms extract both part and spacing information: evidence from developmental prosopagnosia

It is well established that faces are processed by mechanisms that are not used with other objects. Two prominent hypotheses have been proposed to characterize how information is represented by these special mechanisms. The spacing hypothesis suggests that face-specific mechanisms primarily extract information about spacing among parts rather than information about the shape of the parts. In contrast, the holistic hypothesis suggests that faces are processed as nondecomposable wholes and, therefore, claims that both parts and spacing among them are integral aspects of face representation. Here we examined these hypotheses by testing a group of developmental prosopagnosics (DPs) who suffer from deficits in face recognition. Subjects performed a face discrimination task with faces that differed either in the spacing of the parts but not the parts (spacing task), or in the parts but not the spacing of the parts (part task). Consistent with the holistic hypothesis, DPs showed lower performance than controls on both the spacing and the part tasks, as long as salient contrast differences between the parts were minimized. Furthermore, by presenting similar spacing and part tasks with houses, we tested whether face-processing mechanisms are specific to faces, or whether they are used to process spacing information from any stimulus. DPs' normal performance on the tasks of two houses indicates that their deficit does not result from impairment in a general-purpose spacing mechanism. In summary, our data clearly support face-specific holistic hypothesis by showing that face perception mechanisms extract both part and spacing information

An efficient algorithm for minimizing earliness, tardiness, and due-date costs for equal-sized jobs

Department of Logistics2008-2009 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journalAccepted ManuscriptPublishe

How greater mouse-eared bats deal with ambiguous echoic scenes

Echolocating bats have to assign the received echoes to the correct call that generated them. Failing to do so will result in the perception of virtual targets that are positioned where there is no actual target. The assignment of echoes to the emitted calls can be ambiguous especially if the pulse intervals between calls are short and kept constant. Here, we present first evidence that greater mouse-eared bats deal with ambiguity by changing the pulse interval more often, in particular by reducing the number of calls in the terminal group before landing. This strategy separates virtual targets from real ones according to their change in position. Real targets will always remain in a constant position, and virtual targets will jitter back and forth according to the change in the time interval

A functional role of the sky’s polarization pattern for orientation in the greater mouse-eared bat

Animals can call on a multitude of sensory information to orient and navigate. One such cue is the pattern of polarized light in the sky, which for example can be used by birds as a geographical reference to calibrate other cues in the compass mechanism. Here we demonstrate that the female greater mouse-eared bat (Myotis myotis) uses polarization cues at sunset to calibrate a magnetic compass, which is subsequently used for orientation during a homing experiment. This renders bats the only mammal known so far to make use of the polarization pattern in the sky. Although there is currently no clear understanding of how this cue is perceived in this taxon, our observation has general implications for the sensory biology of mammalian vision

A robust method of measuring other-race and other-ethnicity effects: the Cambridge Face Memory Test format

Other-race and other-ethnicity effects on face memory have remained a topic of consistent research interest over several decades, across fields including face perception, social psychology, and forensic psychology (eyewitness testimony). Here we demonstrate that the Cambridge Face Memory Test format provides a robust method for measuring these effects. Testing the Cambridge Face Memory Test original version (CFMT-original; European-ancestry faces from Boston USA) and a new Cambridge Face Memory Test Chinese (CFMT-Chinese), with European and Asian observers, we report a race-of-face by race-of-observer interaction that was highly significant despite modest sample size and despite observers who had quite high exposure to the other race. We attribute this to high statistical power arising from the very high internal reliability of the tasks. This power also allows us to demonstrate a much smaller within-race other ethnicity effect, based on differences in European physiognomy between Boston faces/observers and Australian faces/observers (using the CFMT-Australian)

Nietzsche and Amor Fati

This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity for us) and this, in the knowledge that our love will not modify our fate. Thus such love may seem impossible or pointless. I analyse the distinction between two different sorts of love (eros and agape) and the type of valuation they involve (in the first case, the object is loved because we value it; in the second, we value the object because we love it). I use this as a lens to interpret Nietzsche?s cryptic pronouncements on amor fati and show that while an erotic reading is, up to a point, plausible, an agapic interpretation is preferable both for its own sake and because it allows for a resolution of the paradoxes initially identified. In doing so, I clarify the relation of amor fati to the eternal return on the one hand, and to Nietzsche?s autobiographical remarks about suffering on the other. Finally, I examine a set of objections pertaining both to the sustainability and limits of amor fati, and to its status as an ideal

Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence

The main question examined in this study is not merely how a Nietzschean critique of law would look had Nietzsche ever applied his genealogical method to the question of law, but also what positive function Nietzschean philosophy may ascribe to law - and how law must then be transformed. The methodological parable imagines a post-genealogy or post-ressentiment phase of the human condition, akin to the Marxist post-revolutionary phase: How would law look for the person of power - overman or otherwise - who needs to live among others? How is normativity possible - what are its forms and functions - in a social world that has undergone a reevaluation of all values? The study traces three possible models for conceptualizing law in Nietzschean terms, each requiring a radical shift from traditional (in different contexts: liberal, Christian, bourgeois) conceptions. The first one is play: law as affirming and embracing the essence of the Dionysian, which is perpetual becoming. Play requires us to let go of law\u27s role as the curtailer of arbitrariness. An integral part of the Nietzschean program, it requires a radical reevaluation: not just law\u27s content is overcome, nor merely its bourgeois forms (in Pashukanis\u27 critical terms), but its internal or inherent values of certitude and stability are overcome as well. The model I offer for play is not Zarathustra\u27s dicethrow but Borges\u27 The Lottery in Babylon. The second model is that of resistance, framed by Nietzsche\u27s analysis of power and Deleuze\u27s distinction between active and reactive forces. The insight here is that power requires resistance, and it is law\u27s primary function to empower the other in order to invest value in meeting and confronting her; thus the monism of the will to power not only does not do away with normativity in the public sphere but actually requires it - but for goals opposite to those of liberalism. Resistance is linked to the third model, fashioned after Nietzsche\u27s model of education: here, law performs not as a socializing agent but rather as a liberator of authenticity. Its function is analogous to that of a mentor whose role is to ultimately encourage the pupil into coming into her own will, shedding ressentiment and bad conscience in an active, i.e., non-conscious way; in its relation to consciousness it is the opposite of psychoanalysis. A fourth consideration is then offered, the role of normativity in self-overcoming or self-legislating; namely, how does normativity figure in the will to power\u27s most significant challenge. While all these models work from an interpretation of the will to power as becoming, the last two are especially dependent on the active-reactive distinction. The cornerstone is not to mix up power with representations of power; to realize that the case is not the will that desires power (as an object of desire, this would necessarily involve a representation of power) but power that wills becoming. In dealing with this metaphysical question I expound on a similar crucial interpretation, originally offered by Deleuze; however, I break off from Deleuze\u27s claim that the will to power has nothing to do with any notion of struggle. If this discussion of the will to power is missed, or if it is wrong, the main argument of this article cannot hold. Finally, I use this interpretation of the will to power to solve Kafka\u27s riddle in The Trial: a necessary move once one realizes that, in the ethical history of western culture, Kafka\u27s parable of the seeker of the law before its closed gates continues a sequence that began with Plato\u27s fable of the cave and continued with Zarathustra\u27s cave parable. I add three points that may be termed methodological or contextual. The first is positioning Nietzsche\u27s limited discussion of law and politics as a derivative of his metaphysics of the will and treatment of moral psychology, not as an independent topic to be searched and indexed in some textual corpus. The second is to understand the question of normativity in its particularly Nietzschean sense, i.e., what is X to me/to the overman? , and not in the Kantian sense of uncovering the conditions that entail any synthetic, a-priori sentence (such as normative ones). The last comment places the Nietzschean project in a larger pattern that defined radical thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and whose other cases are Marx and Freud: a new metaphysics (will to power/materialism/id) that uncovers a state of bondage, psychological and material, in which law plays a pivotal role in its function of reinforcer and supplier of a legitimizing language (respectively, of ressentiment, of the relations of production, of Oedipus and the bourgeois family); and finally radical, yet partial ways of overcoming bondage that are not mutually translatable-genealogy, revolution, psychoanalysis