84 research outputs found

    Probing the time course of facilitation and inhibition in gaze cueing of attention in an upper-limb reaching task

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    Previous work has revealed that social cues, such as gaze and pointed fingers, can lead to a shift in the focus of another person’s attention. Research investigating the mechanisms of these shifts of attention has typically employed detection or localization button-pressing tasks. Because in-depth analyses of the spatiotemporal characteristics of aiming movements can provide additional insights into the dynamics of the processing of stimuli, in the present study we used a reaching paradigm to further explore the processing of social cues. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants aimed to a left or right location after a nonpredictive eye gaze cue toward one of these target locations. Seven stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), from 100 to 2,400 ms, were used. Both the temporal (reaction time, RT) and spatial (initial movement angle, IMA) characteristics of the movements were analyzed. RTs were shorter for cued (gazed-at) than for uncued targets across most SOAs. There were, however, no statistical differences in IMAs between movements to cued and uncued targets, suggesting that action planning was not affected by the gaze cue. In Experiment 3, the social cue was a finger pointing to one of the two target locations. Finger-pointing cues generated significant cueing effects in both RTs and IMAs. Overall, these results indicate that eye gaze and finger-pointing social cues are processed differently. Perception–action coupling (i.e., a tight link between the response and the social cue that is presented) might play roles in both the generation of action and the deviation of trajectories toward cued and uncued targets

    Diet composition of otters (Lutra lutra L.) living on small watercourses in southwestern Hungary

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    The diet composition of Eurasian otters (Lutra lutra) was studied by spraint (faecal) analysis (n = 1,460 samples), over a two-year period, on five sections of stream and channel in the Dráva region of southwest Hungary. The primary food of otters was generally fish (range: 33.3–89.9%, biomass estimation), with amphibians of secondary importance (3.4–48.5%). Highest fish consumption was found in winter and lowest in spring. Amphibians were eaten more in spring than in winter. Mammals (range 2.0–9.3%), birds (1.1–4.1%), reptiles (up to 22.2%), crayfish (up to 1.7%) and insects (0.1–4.2%) were consumed at low levels. Trophic niche breadth did not differ significantly between areas, though the widest and lowest seasonal values differed greatly (summer B = 2.48, winter B = 1.12). Otters preyed mainly on small fish (< 100 g in weight, range 88.0–96.9% biomass) at all study areas. Eurytopic (mean 72.7%) and stagnophilic fish (mean 21.7%) were taken preferentially, with lesser consumption of reophilic species (mean 5.6%). Non-native fish were taken most often (mean 71.0%, e.g. giebel carp, brown bullhead). Our results indicate that small watercourses can play an important role as regards otter habitat and, as such, should receive more attention when assessing habitats for otter

    Willingness to Boycott Russian Goods in China : How Political Ideology Shapes Consumer Preferences in an Authoritarian Context

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    Who is likely to engage in Anti-Russian boycotts in China? While existing literature focuses on ethnocentrism and nationalism as drivers of political consumerism, this article explores political boycotts that contradict the dominant discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Drawing on original survey data, the article uses two ideological dimensions—social authoritarianism and attitudes to economic organisation – to delineate three distinct ideological leanings in China: liberalism, the New Left and neo-authoritarianism. The article demonstrates that liberals are more likely than others to support the boycott of Russian products. Additionally, all three groups are more willing to boycott Russian goods if they hold egalitarian attitudes. The findings shed light on the causes of anti-Russian sentiment in China and its likely implications for the Russian economy
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